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ARTICLE
BACK TO THE PARENT: HOLDING COMPANY
LIABILITY FOR SUBSIDIARY BANKS-A
DISCUSSION OF THE NET WORTH
MAINTENANCE AGREEMENT, THE SOURCE
OF STRENGTH DOCTRINE, AND THE
PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION PROVISION
Cassandra Jones Havard*
I.

INTRODUCfION

The unprecedented number of bank l failures2 in the past several years has spawned a crisis in the industry and fueled an extensive debate about how federal regulators can effectively make
banks more responsible for guaranteeing the soundness of their operations. For the federal regulators most involved-the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"),3 Office of Thrift
Supervision ("OTS"),4 and the Federal Reserve Board
• B.A., Bennett College; J.D., University of Pennsylvania; Assistant Professor, Temple
University School of Law. I wish to thank Temple colleagues Tony Bocchino, Amy Boss,
Phoebe Haddon, Rick Greenstein, Michael Libonati, Frank McCellan, Jan Pillai, Rafael
Porrata-Doria, Don Price, David Skeel, and Bill Woodward for their helpful suggestions
and comments on an earlier draft of this article. Raj BahIa and Joyce Hughes also gave
insightful comments. Nefertiti Johnson provided research assistance
1 The term "bank" refers both to federally insured commercial banks as well as savings
and loan institutions ("thrifts").
2 For eight consecutive years, from 1985 to 1992, over 1000 banks and savings and
loans failed across the United States. 1993 FDIC ANN. REp. at Table A; CoNGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, RESOLVING lHE THRIFT CRISIS 88 (1993) (Table C-2). The number of
bank insolvencies hit a peak in 1989, when 306 banks were closed. Barbara A. Rehm, 42
Banks Failed Last Year, Smallest Number Since 1982, AM. BANKER, Jan. 5, 1994, at 3.
3 The FDIC administers two separate deposit insurance funds: the Bank Insurance
Fund ("BIF"), which principally insures commercial banks, and the Savings Association
Insurance Fund ("SAIF"), which principally insures savings and loans associations. Until
1993, member institutions funded the FDIC by paying flat-rate premiums. 12 U.S.c.
§ 1817(b) (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (Supp. V 1993). Beginning with the first
semiannual payment in 1993, the FDIC adopted a transitional risk-related deposit insurance assessment system in order to recapitalize the insurance funds. See 12 C.F.R. § 327
(1994).
4 As a part of the regulatory reforms of the Financial Institutions, Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA"), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1993», Congress abolished the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("Bank Board"), see FIRREA § 401(a)(2), 103 Stat. at 354,
and transferred its functions to the OTS within the Department of Treasury. See FIRREA

2353

2354

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:2353

("FRB")5-Congress is directing the effort to enhance the banks'
guarantees of self-policing. Congress's basic response to the crisis
has been to heighten the minimum capital levels the banks must
maintain to avoid direct corrective intervention by the federal regulatory agencies. 6 In implementing this response, Congress also
§ 301, 103 Stat. at 278 (codified at 12 U.S.c. § 1462a (Supp. V 1993». The Bank Board was
both the regulator of savings and loan associations and the operating head of the savings
and loan insurance fund, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC"),
which FIRREA also abolished. See FIRREA § 401(a)(I), 103 Stat. at 354.
5 The FRB regulates bank holding companies and state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve system. 12 U.S.c. §§ 1841-50 (1988) (bank holding companies); 12 U.S.c. § 248(a) (1988) (state-chartered banks).
6 Although the failure of the nation's savings and loan institutions has been attributed
to depression of the real estate industry, poorly timed deregulation, inadequate regulation,
and economic depression, some commentators point towards the fraud and mismanagement of the savings and loan industry as a significant factor in advancing those failures.
After an institution has been put into receivership, federal regulators may sue the directors
and officers for failing to carry out their duties and responsibilities alleging gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, or self dealing. See Mark I. Rosen & John V. Thomas,
Directors' and Officers'S Liability, in CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS AND PROFESSIONALS: BANK AND THRIFT LITIGATION IN THE 1990's 83 (PLI Com. L.
& Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 565,1991); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFIcE,
DEPOSIT INSURANCE: A STRATEGY FOR REFORM (1991) [hereinafter STRATEGY FOR REFORM] (Report to the Chairman, Committee on Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives); Harris Weinstein, Speech by OTS Chief Counsel Weinstein on Duties of
Depository Institutions Fiduciaries, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 510 (Sept. 24, 1990) (positing
that directors and officers of institutions owe a fiduciary duty to depositors and the federal
insurance fund). But see Joyce A. Hughes, Law Firm Kaye, Scholer, Lincoln S&L and the
OTS,7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 177 (1993) (discussing the legal hurdles
that OTS must clear before finding liability of a director or officer under FIRREA as an
institution-affiliated party).
'
FIRREA sets out a standard of care for officers and directors of depository institutions. 12 U.S.c. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993). The statute defines officers and directors as
"institution-affiliated parties." Id § 1813(u). As an institution-affiliated party, an officer or
director will be liable for gross negligence or "conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross negligence) including intentional tortious conduct, as
such terms are defined under applicable state law." Id § 1821(k); cf FDIC v. Canfield,
967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1992) (interpreting FIRREA to permit a lawsuit against directors
and officers of a failed savings and loan on a theory of simple negligence; the court's reasoning was based on FIRREA's deference to the state law's definition of gross negligence).
Prior to FIRREA, an institution-affiliated party was protected from regulatory enforcement actions upon resignation. FIRREA extends liability retroactively to misconduct that
is yet undiscovered. FIRREA § 905, 103 Stat. at 459 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)
(Supp. V 1993».
FIRREA also created a three-tier structure for violations of banking laws and regulations, and increased the amount of civil monetary penalties that the agencies may assess.
See generally 12 U.S.c. § 1818(i)(2) (Supp. V 1993). Fines for a first-tier violation may be
up to $5000 per day, an increase from the $1000 or $100 per day under prior law. Id.
§ 1818(i)(2)(A). Second-tier violations have a civil money penalty of up to $25,000 per
day. Id. § 1818(i)(2)(B). Third-tier violations carry a penalty of $1,000,000 per day for
individuals and the lesser of $1,000,000 per day or 1% of total assets per day for institutions. Id. § 1818(i)(2)(C)-(D).
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has focused on the regulation of banks in a holding company7
structure.
Banks owned by a holding company always have presented a
unique challenge to the federal regulators' efforts to assure minimal capital adequacy. Holding companies, by definition, shift assets among various subsidiaries in order to operate efficiently and
to minimize loss. A bank holding company's decision on shifting.
assets among its banking subsidiaries can lead ultimately to a federally insured bank's insolvency.8 Yet, because of the corporate
law doctrine of limited liability, the federal deposit insurance system-and potentially the taxpayers-bear, in major part, the insolvent, federally insured bank's losses. 9
. Thus; in the reform legislation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act ("FDICIA"),l0 Congress focused on parent or holding company responsibility for the
maintenance of capital levels of subsidiary banks. Congress, by
legislating the prompt corrective action provision ,11 reformed prior
ineffective attempts aimed at regulating parental accountability
through the regulatory tool of the parental guarantee.
The parental guarantee is a parent company's commitment
that, if necessary, it will make a capital infusion into its banking
subsidiary in order to maintain the subsidiary's minimum regulatory capital requirements. By requiring the guarantee of compliance with regulatory capital standards from the parent company,
7 A bank holding company is defined as a "company which has control over any bank
or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company ... if the company
directly or indirectly ... owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 per centum ... of any
voting securities." 12 U.S.C. § 1B41(a)(1)-(2) (1988); see Lissa L. Broome, Redistributing
Bank Insolvency Risks: Challenges to Limited Liability in the Bank Holding Company
Structure, 26 U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 935, 959 n.93 (t993) (noting that banks which are members of a holding company structure have more than 90% of all bank assets); see also
Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 107
HARV. L. REV. 507 (1994).
'
8 See discussion infra part II.B.
9 The FDIC, as the insurer of depository· institutions, may not have the resources in
the insurance fund to finance the faililres of depository institutions entirely on its own.
However, since the federal government guarantees that the federal insurance fund will
meet its obligations to depositors, taxpayers are ultimately liable. 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (Supp.
V 1993).
10 Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.c. (Supp. V 1993». FDICIA created new capital standards for alI federally insured
depository institutions.
11 12 U.S.C. § 18310(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993). Regulations for enforcing the provision
were promulgated by the Department of 'freasury, Federal Reserve System, and FDIC,
and became effective on December 19, 1992. 12 C.F.R. §§ 6, 19,565,208,263,308 & 325
(1994).
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Congress has shifted the banking subsidiary's financial risk taking
away from the federal deposit insurance fund to the parent
company.
This shift of financial risk is consistent with the congressional
concern of strengthening the capitaP2 adequacy of the nation's
banks. At the core of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA")13 and FDICIA are provisions
addressing the capital adequacy of the nation's banks. The congressional focus on the capital levels is appropriate considering that
low capital levels at many institutions contributed to the failure of
those institutions and prompted the legislative reforms. After all,
capital is a cushion against default.14 To shareholders, capital absorbs the bank's losses and thus, protects an investor's investment
from the firm's insolvency. To creditors, capital represents a form
of protection for repayment. To the federal deposit insurance
fund, capital represents the amount by which the insurance fund
will be shielded from losses should the institution become
insolvent.
Under the reform legislation, Congress now has defined minimum capital standards15 for each institution that the federal bank12 In the banking context, there are two relevant capital measures: the leverage limit,
which relates an institution's capital to its total assets, and risk-based capital, which relates
an institution's capital to its risk-adjusted assets. See 12 U.S.C. § 18310(c)(I)(A) (Supp. V
1993).
13 Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1993». FIRREA set new capital standards for thrifts. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(t) (Supp. V 1993). Beginning in the mid-1980s, Congress raised the minimum capi~
tal standards for thrifts, to be phased in from 1986 to 1993. See 12 U.S.c. § 3907 (1988)
(authorizing procedures for the enforcement of capital adequacy standards).
14 A bank with an adequate capital level produces several regulatory benefits. These
include: 1) lower probability of bank failure; 2) reduced incentive to take excessive risks; 3)
buffer against the insurance fund and the taxpayer; 4) reduced misallocation of credit; 5)
avoidance of "credit crunches"; and 6) increased long-term competitiveness. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS II-I to -4 (1991) [hereinafter MODERNIZING THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM]. For a discussion of a bank's capital structure, see Joseph J. Norton,
Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate Regulatory Concern for Prudential Supervision
of Banking Activities, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1299 (1989).
15 Section 38 identifies five capital-based categories for insured institutions. The statute
defines them as follows:
1. Well capitalized: The institution "significantly exceeds the required minimum level for each relevant capital measure";
2. Adequately capitalized: The institution "meets the required minimum level
for each relevant capital measure";
3. Undercapitalized: The institution "fails to meet the required minimum
level for any relevant capital measure";
4. Significantly undercapitalized: The institution "is significantly below the required minimum level for any required capital measure"; and
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ing regulatory agencies supervise. 16 Those standards are also the
basis for federal regulatory actions. The lack of capital adequacy is
sufficient to trigger government intervention in financially troubled
institutions. Capital-based regulations impose stringent regulatory
controls, including dividend 17 and growth restrictions 18 and forced
conservatorship.19 The capital-based regulations also remove from
the regulatory agencies much of the discretion that the regulators
once had in managing a capital-weakened institution. 20
Congress justified the capital adequacy reforms by referring to
the protection that the federal deposit insurance fund provides to
federally insured institutions and the "moral hazard"21 that its protection creates. By protecting depositors of less. than $100,000, the
fund encourages bank managers-especially those of capital-weakened institutions-to make risky investments. 22
In addition to the nondiscretionary regulatory controls of the
reform legislation, the prompt corrective· action provision requires
an undercapitalized23 banking subsidiary to submit a capital restoration plan to its banking regulator. Within that plan, the parent
company must guarantee that the banking subsidiary will meet regulatory capital requirements for four consecutive quarters. 24 By requiring the guarantee of compliance with regulatory capital
5. Critically undercapitalized: The institution fails to meet the leverage limit.
12 U.S.C. § 18310(b)(I)(A)-(E) (Supp. V 1993).
16 FDICIA's legislative changes were partly the result of GAO and Department of the
lreasury studies which determined that more stringent capital standards would alert regulators to the potential failure of troubled institutions. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
BANK SUPERVISION: PROMPT AND FORCEFUL REGULATORY AcrlONS NEEDED (1991) (R,eport to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Supervision, Regulations
and Insurance Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives); MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 14, at X-I0 to -24.
17 FDICIA § 131(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 18310(d)(I)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
18 Id. (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 18310(e)(3)-(4) (Supp. V 1993».
19 Id. § 133(a) (codified at 12 U.S.c. §§ 191, 203(a), 1464(d), 1821(c) (Supp. V 1993».
20 See discussion infra part IV ..
21 Moral hazard refers to the disincentive that managers of an inadequately capitalized
institutions have to operate in a risk-free manner. To restore a troubled bank to profitability, bank managers are tempted to engage in high-risk strategies, hoping for a high return.
Should their efforts fail, the bank's losses are passed on to the insurance fund, which guarantees deposit accounts that do not exceed $100,000. See William A. Lovett, Moral Hazard., Bank Supervision and Risk-Based Capital Requirements, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1365,1381
(1989); see also Krishna G. Mantripragada, Depositors as a Source of Market Discipline, 9
YALE J. ON REG. 543,548-49 (1992).
22 See Richard S. Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, 12 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 317 (1993) (reviewing the history of the
prompt corrective action provision).
23 See discussion supra note 15.
24 See 12 U.S.C. § 18310(e)(2)(C)(ii)(I) (Supp. V 1993); see also 57 Fed. Reg. 44,866,
44,879 (1992).
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standards from the parent company, the insurance fund shifts the
banking subsidiary's financial risk taking to the parent company.
In so doing, a parental guarantee effectively negates the corporate
law doctrine of limited liability for bank holding companies and
their federally insured subsidiaries. This statutory risk shifting
from the insurance fund to the parent company raises serious questions about the propriety of the governmental protection of the
federal deposit insurance fund at the expense of the time-honored
doctrine of corporate separateness and limited liability.
Given the statutory goal of parental accountability, this Article focuses oil a narrow issue: Whether parental guarantees are the
most effective regulatory tool for shielding the federal deposit insurance fund from losses when insured banking subsidiaries that
are members of a multi bank holding company system are insolvent. This Article posits that a needed complement to parental
guarantees is temporary substantive consolidation 9f a holding
company's affiliated banks. This would require the parent company to combine the assets of its banking siblings to facilitate the
reorganization of a financially troubled subsidiary. Temporaryenterprise consolidation is a necessary regulatory tool because it provides an early form of intracorporate funding from any healthy
banking subsidiary that has contributed to the weakened capital
status of the financially troubled banking subsidiary.
Part II of this Article discusses inherent structural problems of
the multi bank holding company system. It shows how these unique
situations become problematic when a banking subsidiary threatens failure. Part III discusses the traditional prereform parental
guarantees-the FRB's source of strength condition and the OTS's
net worth maintenance agreement. It concludes that both of these
regulatory tools, which are essentially identical, have become disfavored by the regulatory agencies and the courts as enforcement
methods. The source of strength condition is arguably beyond the
statutory authority of the FRB. The implied net worth maintenance obligation often is unenforceable because it is overbroad and
vague. Part IV briefly examines several of the inadequacies of the
newest parental guarantee-the prompt corrective action provision. Part V serves as background for the use of temporary consolidation in the banking industry by discussing the FDIC's methods
of resolving failed financial institutions; it explains how interaffiliate lending and captive funding may generate large loan losses
and thereby increase the costs of failures within a multibank system. Part VI recommends an alternative to the prompt corrective
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action provision: temporary consolidation of troubled or undercapitalized banking subsidiaries within a bank holding company
system. This alternative addresses the public policy objective of
protecting subsidiary banks and the insurance fund within the
framework of the corporate law doctrine of limited liability.
II.

THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY: INHERENT
STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS

When a parent company owns more than one banking subsidiary, several operational factors unique to that structure complicate
regulatory oversight. The doctrine of limited liability, the rules
governing interaffiliate transfers, and the creation of banking conglomerates through the parent-subsidiary structure each pose regulatory oversight issues for multibank holding companies. The
discussion in Section A oil the doctrine of limited liability questions whether, in the banking context, there should be an evaluation of the parent company's conduct or behavior in exercising
control over a banking subsidiary when a banking subsidiary either
becomes undercapitalized or fails?5 There is reason for concern
about the application of the doctrine in the banking context because the ultimate costs of a banking subsidiary's failure may be
shifted to the federal deposit insurance fund. Section B, discussing
the rules that allow transfers among affiliates in a multi bank holding company system,26 highlights the dilemma for the insurance
fund when a financially troubled banking subsidiary threatens failure. That is, transfers among affiliates, may contribute to the failure of the financially troubled bank subsidiary. When the 'financial
condition of the banking subsidiary holding the deposits deteriorates sufficiently to threaten its solvency, the healthy sibling banking ~ubsidiary withdraws its deposits. The result is that the nowinsolvent banking subsidiary must receive financial assistance from
the insurance fund, to absorb the losses from the deposits withdrawn by the sibling bank.27 Finally, Section C identifies the risks
25 See 12 U.S.C. § 18310(d)(I)(A) (Supp. V 1993); see also Jonathan M. Landers, A
Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI.
L. REV. 589 (1975) (arguing that the poor economic performance of a subsidiary always
raises the issue of whether a parent company is actively participating in monitoring and
controlling the affairs of the subsidiary and therefore should be held responsible for the
subsidiary's failure) .
. 26 12 U.S.c. § 371c (Supp. V ,1993) regulates loans and purchases of assets between a
bank and its affiliates, within proscribed limits. See discussion infra part II.B.
27 Regulators call this phenomenon "captive funding," an arrangement that concentrates the majority of a bank holding company's assets, usually deposits; in the largest bank
or banks. See discussion infra part II.B.
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for the deposit insurance fund when the exponential growth of
baIlking subsidiaries within the holding company structure creates
an entity that is "too big to fail." This doctrine provides greater
protection for depositors in large institutions than it does for those
who place their funds in smaller ones, preventing depositors of
above $100,000 from sustaining their proportion of the loss in an
institution. 28
A.

The Doctrine of Limited Liability

The doctrine of limited liability assures investors that their risk
in a corporation will be limited to their investment. This means
that should the corporation become insolvent, a single shareholder's losses are no greater than the capital contributions which
the shareholder has made to the firm. This concept also means that
when a corporation becomes insolvent, the cost of the failure of the
corporation shifts to creditors and then eventually to society.29 In
the banking industry, the risk of failure may shift to the insurance
fund. 30
The holding company structure, by definition, dictates a different organizational format for the management of the related corporations. The same holds true in banking and nonbanking parentsubsidiary relationships. Generally, although a subsidiary in a
holding company structure will have its own management team, its
policies and procedures are not routinely independent and separate from those of its parent. 31 While the holding company may
allow the subsidiary's management some discretion in its operational and organizational structure, it will closely monitor those
See discussion infra accompanying note 63.
Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV.
80, 99-106 (1991) (arguing that instead of an incidence of incorporation granted by the
state, limited liability should be available though private agreements made between the
parties). Historically, shareholders of banks were responsible for a proportional share of
the bank's losses upon the institution's insolvency. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: History and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 31,36-39 (1992).
30 See supra note 21.
31 See discussion infra accompanying note 160 (concerning FirstRepublic Bancorporation); see also Kieran J. Fallon, Note, Source of Strength or Source of Weakness?: A Cri·
tique of the "Source-of-Strength" Doctrine in Banking Reform, 66 N.Y.V. L. REv. 1344,
1385 n.265 (1991) (noting that common areas of consolidated operation in the bank hold·
ing company context are "funds management, advertising, check processing, electronic
funds transfer, corporate counsel, corporate planning, purchasing, personnel management
and accounting").
28

29
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choices. 32 Similarly, to maximize its own profitability, the holding
company may shift capital among its subsidiaries as the performance of the subsidiaries dictates. This exercise of control may not
be greater in the banking context, but it may be more deleterious.
Whenever a bank becomes financially weakened, the soundness of
its operations is threatened. 33
What is distinguishable regarding banks operating in the holding company structure is the existence of the federal deposit insurance fund. This choice of corporate structure has significant
consequences when the parent company uses the banking subsidiary to shift risks.34 The insurance fund picks up the losses because
each banking subsidiary in a Inultibank holding company structure
is a separate corporate entity.35 Recourse to the parent corporation or holding company is not possible. 36 While the parent company also owns stock in the banking subsidiary and exercises
control of ownership, its liability is limited to its ownership interests in the banking subsidiary.37 The 'application of limited liability
32 See Robert C. Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92 HARV. L.
REv. 787, 819-22 (1979); see generally Bernard F. Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man
Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 473,492-498 (1953);
William O. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary
Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193 (1929); Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49
TEX. L. REV. 979, 991-93 (1973); Note, Liability of a Corporation for the Acts of a Subsidiary or Affiliate, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1122 (1958).
33 See Clark, supra note 32, at 828-33 (discussing the possibility of fraud, bias, and selfdealing in intercompany transactions and the concomitant rieed for regulation). The parent company, for example, may decrease the banking subsidiary's capital level within appropriate regulatory limitations. Parental guarantees facilitate the movement of capital
among subsidiaries, making the capital of the parent company available to the banking
subsidiaries. As such, they protect the capital adequacy of the banking subsidiary while
allowing the parent company to become more profitable by reallocating capital as needed.
See discussion infra part I1.B.
34 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Oil. L. REV. 89,109-13 (1985) (arguing that while limited liability facilitates the
corporate form of organization, its social costs and benefits may not provide an incentive
to stop the costs of a firm engaging in risky activities).
35 A corporation may own stock issued by another corporation. See HARRY G. HENN
& JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 183 (1983); see also Clark, supra note
32, at 795; PHILIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CoRPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL
PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS (1983).
36 Banks within a holding company structure have separate corporate identities and are
not liable for the activities of other banks. 12 U.S.c. §§ 1841-1850 (1988). By contrast,
branches are jointly responsible for the liabilities of each other. Id. § 36(d).
37 Inherent in the ownership structure of a bank by a parent company is the conflict
that exists between creditors and shareholders. Shareholders who choose to exercise control over a corporation may divert funds from the corporation to themselves. These same
funds are assets that may be partially owned by creditors, or in this case' of banks, depositors. This occurs even in the regulated environment of banking because of the rules allowing interaffiliate transfers. See discussion infra part I1.B; see also Daniel R. Fischel et
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in the banking industry may mean that the parent company shifts
to the insurance fund the losses the parent wOllld ordinarily
shoulder. 38
A closer examination of the doctrine of limited liability and its
supporting policy rationales in the context of the holding company
requires a review of whether and how the parent company
monitors and disciplines its subsiciiaries. 39 Generally, a parent
company is afforded the protection of limited liability vis-a-vis its
subsidiary. Even when that subsidiary becomes insolvent and the
parent company has exercised control, the parent company receives the protection of limited liability although it may have contributed to the subsidiary's insolvency.4o But should the protection
afforded by the limiteq .liability principle be extended even when
the parent's conduct contributed to the subsidiary's insolvency?
The specific focus should be whether the parent company exercised
legal control over its subsidiary's corporate behavior and the impact of that control on the member subsidiaries of the holding company structure. 41
aI., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REv. 301, 314-16
(1987) (criticizing the current capital structure and the moral hazard of deposit insurance
as inefficient in forcing investors to monitor and control bank losses.)
38 See Ribstein, supra note 29, at 99-101.
39 While recognizing that limited liability facilitates the separation of ownership and
control, Professor Stone discusses the need for enterprise liability, which combines the rule
of limited liability and agency in a manner that threatens corporate funds and assures accountability when there is an absence of passive ownership. Christopher D. Stone, The
Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1,8 (1980).
The rationale for the rule of limited liability is that individual investors should be protected
from the costs of a corporation's failure, although those costs will have to be borne by
other parts of society. As Professor Stone explains, enterprise liability shifts the costs of
corporate conduct away from society to the enterprise. This theory is based on the presumption that the m·embers of the corporate enterprise operate it for their optimal advantage. Id. at 9.
40 As with nonrelated corporations, banking subsidiaries within a multibank holding
company structure are allowed to transfer funds among themselves. See discussion of Section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act infra part II.B. When a single institution within the
multibank holding company structure becomes financially troubled, the related corporations withdraw their funding and allow the financially troubled institution to fail. See infra
notes 160-68 and accompanying text discussing FirstRepublic Bancorporation. The entities
can behave as though they are separate economic units when one is about to fail, although
before failure, they were behaving as a common corporate unit. See discussion of substan.
tive consolidation infra part VI.
Parental guaranteeS make the doctrine of limited liability inapplicable in the context
of a multibank holding company. As an incidence of ownership of a federally insured
financial institution, the parent company accepts some responsibility for the debts of the
subsidiary. See discussion infra part IV.
41 Because limited liability may carry a relatively low monitoring burden, creditors, in
fact, may rely on shareholders' monitoring of the firm's risky investments to protect their
residual interest. The creditors' interest in the firm's performance may depend on whether
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When corporations are related, a review of their internal arrangements can correlate to the corporations' external affairs.42 To
review the corporate behavior of the entire enterprise is to examine the close relationship between the parent company and its
subsidiaries to assess internal and external effects.43 Such a review
begins with the assumption th~t a parent company that wholly
owns a subsidiary is not a passive investor.44 Instead, the parent
company is a shareholder that actively assesses financial information about anyone subsidiary in order to protect the entire corporate enterprise. As an active shareholder, the parent company
should take measures to control speculative transactions. To allow
an active shareholder the protection of limited liability means that
the parent company retains for itself the benefits that result when
the enterprise shifts its risks to the creditors. 1)1e parent company,
although it exercises control over the conduct of its subsidiaries,
may chose not to control the risky conduct of a subsidiary, allowing
it to become financially weakened, or even insolvent. As a result,
the parent company, as shareholder, may lose its investment in that
subsidiary, and yet, the parent company has protected the assets of
other subsidiaries.
Limited liability in the holding company context is inconsistent with the legal control that a parent company may exercise over

they have a secured status and the amount of risk reduction that they expect to maintain
through monitoring. See Stone, supra note 39, at 68-70.
42 See id. at 72. The review of the internal relationships of related corporations is not
limited to related corporations, but may also be necessary when a majority or dominant
shareholder exercises control over a corporation. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280
A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (discussing the fiduciary duty of care that a majority shareholder
owes to the corporation).
43 The manner in which the parent company exercises control over a subsidiary's operational and organizational structure is best evaluated in comparison to a similarly situated
corporation that is not a member of a holding company structure .. Only then can an accurate evaluation be made of whether the subsidiary's performance is different than it would
have been without limited liability. See generally Christopher W. Frost, Organizational
Form, Misappropriation Risk, and the Substantive Consolidation of Corporate Group, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 449 (1993); Mark L. Prager & Jonathan A. Backman, Pursuing Alter-Ego
Liability Against Nonbankrupt Third Parties: Structuring a Comprehensive Conceptual
Framework, 35 ST. LoUIS U. LJ. 657,701-08 (1991) (discussing creditor remedies under an
alter ego theory and arguing that limited liability should not be recognized when the corporate owners have ignored the "formalities and purposes of the corporation's separate legal
existence" to their advantage).
44 Shareholders who are passive investors do not monitor the performance of the corporation or take an active part in its management. See Ribstein, supra note 29, at 102-03;
see also Susan E. Woodward, Limited Liability in the Theory of the Firm, in FOUNDATIONS
OF CORPORATE LAW 72 (Roberta Romanoed., 1972).
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its subsidiary.45 Just as it is appropriate for a parent company to
intervene to monitor and discipline its subsidiary, it is also appropriate to make the parent company liable when it performs this
function in a manner that jeopardizes the financial soundness of
the subsidiary. Parent companies may direct the movement of the
assets and liabilities among affiliates in a way that is designed to
minimize loss to the holding company.46 In the banking context, a
banking subsidiary's insolvency that is generated by the parent
company's management is most likely to result in the insurance
fund, rather than the parent, absorbing the insolvency. However,
when the interest of the parent company as shareholder-who generates the risks-are measured against those of the public-who
must finance the shareholder's risk-public policy weighs in favor
of protecting the public and, in the banking context, the insurance
fund.
Removing the protection of limited liability in the holding
company context threatens the funds of the entire holding company structure. It also requires the parent company to be accountable for and to monitor internal corporate relationships.
Ultimately, the parent company controls unwanted corporate conduct. 47 When this occurs in the context of a bank holding company, the federal deposit insurance fund benefits.48
45 See Stone, supra note 39, at 45-47, 73. In the banking context, the parent company's
conduct may implicate its complicity in contributing to the subsidiary's poor performance
when the parent company causes or allows the subsidiary to engage in misconduct. See
discussion infra part VI.c.
46 Parent company operations also present the possibility of fraudulent transfers. The
parent company, because of its method and manner of operation, may allow transfers that
increase the losses that would be borne by the insurance fund while decreasing losses to
itself. This can occur in one of two ways. The parent company may transfer poorly performing assets that have inflated values to a troubled institution which ultimately receives
financial assistance from the FDIC. Alternatively, the parent company may choose to sell
or transfer good performing assets from a troubled institution for less than fair market
value to a bank owned by the parent company. Although these transactions are prohibited, they are difficult to detect. See infra notes 49-51. A proposed remedy to avoid this
problem is to require the full collaterization of interaffiliate transfers. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CoRPORATION, DEPOSIT INSURANCE FOR TIlE NINETIES, MEETING TIlE
CHALLENGES 232 (Draft Report, Jan. 4, 1989) [hereinafter DEPOSIT INSURANCE FOR THE
NINETIES]; see also discussion infra part II.B; discussion of moral hazard supra note 21.
47 See Stone, supra note 39, at 59-61. When those who manage and those who invest
capital are the same, management and shareholders monitor each other's performance.
48 As discussed in Part VI, substantive consolidation is corporate bankruptcy's method
of circumventing limited liability when there are related corporations.
In the banking context, ideally, the examination process provides a mechanism for the
regulatory agency to monitor the parent company's conduct. Some commentators criticize
the regulatory agencies, who they view as in a superior position for assessing information
and monitoring activities, for not more closely controlling the conduct of parent compa-
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Interaffiliate Lending and Captive Funding

The rules of interaffiliate lending also pose dangers when a
banking subsidiary in a multibank holding company system threatens failure. Sections 23A49 and 23B50 of the Federal Reserve Act
limit transactions among bank holding company affiliates. These
rules prevent banking and nonbanking subsidiaries within a holding company system from experiencing overexposure to excessive
risks and losses. The rules are fluid enough to recognize that the
nature of holding company operations is to transfer assets freely
among affiliates as dictated by market conditions. 51
Section 23A limits the aggregate amount of all "covered"52
transactions between a bank and its affiliates to twenty percent of
the bank's capital and surplus. The statute provides several exempnies. These commentators argue that regulators are in a position to detect and abort some
of the conduct that is disastrous to their banking subsidiaries. See discussion infra notes
140-46 (criticizing the newest parental guarantee, the prompt corrective action provision,
as unnecessarily extending the protection of limited liability for parent companies when
other mechanisms of control over the parent company's conduct are available and more
effective ).
There are a number of regulatory prohibitions that will minimize the type of risks to
which a parent company may expose the bank subsidiary. For example, bank subsidiaries
have minimal capital requirements set by regulation. Those business considerations which
at times make inadequate capitalization profitable, e.g., the company can operate at a loss
or "break even point" and thereby yield substantial tax advantages, are illegal for bank
subsidiaries. Another advantage of the holding company structure is the commingling of
funds and property among affiliated corporations. See supra text accompanying notes 1520; see also Joseph H. Sommer, The Subsidiary: Doctrine Without a Cause?, 59 FORDHAM
L. REv. 227, 234 (1990).
49 Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 23A, 48 Stat. 162, 183 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 371c (1988».
50 Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 102(a), 101 Stat.
552,564 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 371c-l (1988».
51 See Carl Felsenfeld, The Bank Holding Company Act: Has It Lived Its Life?, 38
VILL. L. REV. 1,88-90 (1993).
52 "Covered" transactions include:
(1) a loan or extension of credit by a bank to an affiliate;
(2) a purchase by a bank of an investment in securities issued by an affiliate;
(3) a purchase by a bank of assets from an affiliate, including assets subject to
an agreement to repurchase;
(4) the acceptance by a bank of securities issued by an affiliate as collateral or
a loan or extension of credit by the bank to any person or company; and
(5) the issuance by a bank of a guarantee, acceptance, or letter of credit, including an endorsement or standby letter of credit, on behalf of an
affiliate.
12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(7)(A)-(E) (1988).
An "affiliate" is a company that controls or is under the common control of the bank
and includes subsidiaries of banking holding companies as well as banking and nonbanking
companies that are under common individual control. Id. § 371c(b)(I)(A).
The section also requires that all covered transactions between bank and affiliates are
conducted on tenns that are consistent with safe and sound banking practices. Id.
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tions, three of which are important for banks operating in a multibank holding system. First, if the same bank holding company
owns eighty percent of each subsidiary bank's stock, a sibling bank
is exempt from the restrictions found in Section 23A.53 Second,
Section 23A exempts deposits made in an affiliated bank in the
ordinary course of correspondent business. 54 Finally, it also exempts transactions secured by United States government obligations. 55 These exemptions promote efficiency in intercorporate
transfers by allowing the bank holding company to operate to maximize profits by. moving assets among subsidiaries as it deems
necessary.56
Notwithstanding the restrictions found in the Bank Holding
Company Act, from which affiliated banking subsidiaries are exempt, there are no other controls that dictate the conduct of banking subsidiaries within a multi bank holding company system.
Traditionally, larger banking subsidiaries within the structure treat
smaller banking subsidiaries as' though they are branches within a
single bank.57 Regulators call this practice "captive funding."58 Its
practical effect is that the larger banking subsidiaries generate most
of the loan business, but the funding for these loans comes from
the smaller banking subsidiaries through interaffiliate lending.
These rules that regulate interaffiliate lending allow banking
subsidiaries within the multibank holding company system to oper§ 371c(a)(4). There are stringent collateral requirements imposed on these transactions,
requiring collateral of 1()()-130%. [d. § 371c(c)(1).
53 These assets must be of a good quality and comply with safe and sound banking
practices. [d. § 371c(c)'(3), (a)(4).
54 [d. § 371c(d)(2).
55 [d. § 371c(d)(4); see also 12 C.F.R § 201.l08(b)(1)-(20) (1994) (listing qualifying
obligations).
56 Although Section 23B prescribes credit standards to be used in evaluating "covered"
transactions between a bank and its affiliates, 12 U.S.c. § 371c-1(a)(1) (1988), they are not
applicable if the transaction is one of those exempted under Section 23A. [d. § 371c1(d)(3). More importantly, it excludes sibling banks from the definition of affiliates under
the statute. [d. § 371c(b)(2). Section 23B, nonetheless, provides that the terms and circumstances, including credit standards, for a "covered" transaction must at least be as
favorable as those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with or involving
nonaffiliated companies. [d. § 371c-1(a)(1)(A). If there are no comparable transactions,
the transaction must be offered in good faith and at "arms-length." [d. § 371c-1(a)(1)(B).
As discussed infra part V.B, most affiliate banks in a multibank holding company system
take advantage of the Section 23A exemptions.
57 See supra text accompanying note 36.
58 This term was first used by then-Chairman L. William Seidman of the FDIC in proposing legislation to abate the problem of multibank holding company failures. See 134
CONGo REC. Sl1,440 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1988) (statement of Sen. Proxmire); see also discussion infra part VI recommending temporary substantive consolidation as a means of
resolving the problem of capital-weakened institutions.
.
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ate as a single entity. It is this very scenario that contributed to the
massive losses generated by the Texas bank centers, MCorp, FirstRepublic and TAB.59 As in the operation of those systems, the
smaller banking subsidiaries act as a funding source for another
banking subsidiary, often denoted as the "lead" bank. The lead
bank amasses its funds from most, if not all, of the smaller banking
subsidiaries. The lead ban~ then uses these funds to make its financial commitments.6o
If a parent company uses interaffiliate lending to the fullest
extent, the effect is that the lead bank may hold all of the liquid
capital of the holding company's subsidiaries. The smaller banks
become "deposit harvesters," gathering deposits of customers and
depositing those monies into the lead bank. The lead bank becomes a "loan harvester," generating most of the new loans to customers based on its increased capital base. 61 This type of
interaffiliate lending or captive funding contributes to the larger
bank's insolvency. A smaller banking subsidiary may have made
loans to its larger affiliate without observing prudential lending
practices. When these loan assets begin to deteriorate, the smaller
banking subsidiaries withdraw their liquid assets. The lead bank
suffers losses from nonperforming loans made to customers and
shifts those losses to the FDIC. One basis on which a cOQrt may
disregard corporate separateness is when a corporation draws upon
the capital resources of a sibling or parent company because it is
inadequately capitalized. Using assets to fund one banking subsidiary that belong to another and assets that are transferable on demand indicates that one or the other affiliate bank does not have
sufficient capital to engage in the type of large scale lending that it
may be conducting. 62 Thus, captive funding is one way of showing
See discussion infra part V.B.
The financing sources that the smaller banking subsidiaries provide often vary in
form. The smaller banking subsidiaries may deposit large amounts of liquid assets into the
lead bank. This may include the smaller banking subsidiary's capital accounts, federal
funds accounts, or certificates of deposits. Financing to the lead bank may also include
smaller banking subsidiaries making unsecured loans to the lead bank. See. DEPOSIT INSURANCE FOR THE NINETIES, supra note 46, at 227-33.
61 Federally insured banks that are members of the Federal Reserve system must comply with reserve requirements as set out in 12 U.S.C. § 461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This
provision requires banks to maintain reserves against their deposits to meet the demands
for withdrawals and avoid a sudden liquidity crisis. The lead ba~k is able to increase its
credit function of making loans because the deposits from the smaller banks boost the lead
bank's reserve requirement.
62 See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 35, § 148. When a sibling bank has relied
upon interaffiliate funding, the FDIC must decide which financing alternative will best
protect the interests of the deposit insurance fund. Often this results in protecting the
59

60
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that individual subsidiaries within a multibank holding company
system have disregarded their corporate form and therefore are
not separate economic units. As discussed in Part VI, such a showing should be sufficient to persuade a court that because corporations did not operate as separate corporate entities, their financial
problems should not be resolved by treating them as though they
were separate entities.
C.

Joint Failure Risks: "Too Big to Fail"

The final structural factor unique to the operation of a multibank holding company occurs when the holding company's size
poses a systemic risk in the event of failure. The "too big to fail"
doctrine means that uninsured depositors or creditors of a failed
bank receive full payment when an institution fails.63 The erosion
of public confidence in the nation's economy justifies, at least in
the regulators' minds, shoring up a failing banking subsidiary in a
multibank holding company.64
healthy sibling institution although that institution's lending practices have contributed to
the weakened capital status of the failing institution. See discussion of FDIC failure resolution alternatives infra part V.A.
63 This occurs because the FDIC often offers direct financial assistance to assist an open
bank's merger with a healthy institution. Naturally, this facilitates the insolvent bank's
remaining open and protects all depositors as well as results in fewer disruptions to banking services. Former FDIC Chairman William Seidman dubbed the policy "imprecise
shorthand for 'too big to allow uninsured depositors to suffer losses.''' Economic Implications of the "Too Big to Fail" Policy: Hearings Before the Economic Stabilization Subcomm.
of the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Comm., 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1991)
[hereinafter "Too Big to Fail"] (testimony of L. William Seidman, Chairman, FDIC); see
also John F. Bovenzi & Arthur J. Muton, Resolution Costs of Bank Failures, 1 FDIC BANK·
ING REV. 1,2 (1988). The protection occurs because the FDIC usually arranges a purchase
and assumption transaction, which allows the acquiring bank to assume the assets and deposit liabilities of a failed bank. As a result of the acquiring bank accepting all of the
deposits of the failed institution, both insured and uninsured, the transaction protects uninsured depositors. See discussion infra part IV; see also Fischel et aI., supra note 37, at 313;
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big To Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 994-95 (1992).
FDICIA limits the FDIC's authority to use the "too big to fail" policy. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(c)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1993). Under FDICIA, the FDIC must meet a "least-cost" test
before giving financial assistance. Id. Thus, a purchase and assumption transaction protecting uninsured depositors can be used only if it is the least costly compared to all other
possible financial transactions. Id. § 1823(c)(E)(iii). If the FDIC, FRB, and the Secretary
of the Treasury determine that the effects of the failure would cause serious "systemic
risk," then the statute authorizes them to jointly agree to protect uninsured depositors or
creditors. Id. § 1823(c)(E)(iii); see also Wilmarth, supra, at 996 nn.183-84.
64 The failure of the Continental Illinois bank system provides an example of systemic
risk failure. In 1984, Continental had extensive (over 1,000) correspondent bank accounts,
which means that other banks held their accounts with Continental. Sixty-six of those correspondent banks had uninsured deposits exceeding 100% of capital and 113 had deposits
equalling 50-100% of capital. Had the FDIC chosen not to protect Continental, that deci-
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The integral role that banks provide in the payments system
means that other financial markets signal distress when large financial institutions become insolvent. 65 The failure of large financial
institutions undoubtedly undercuts the public confidence in the nation's system of banking, specifically, and its economy as a whole.
These failures erode confidence when the public perceives that the
regulators are not responsive to the problems of the institutions
and markets. The magnitude of potential losses in the failure of
large financial institutions are sudden and uncontrollable. Thus,
"too big to fail" is in effect choosing to ignore established bank
liquidation principles when certain banking organizations become
insolvent because ignoring those principles is necessary to protect
claimants and minimize disruptions.
When determining the most appropriate failure resolution
method, the FDIC balances several policy objectives. These include minimizing the cost to the insurance fund, maintaining the
stability of the financial system, encouraging market discipline,
minimizing disruptions to the community, and providing consistent
treatment to banks of all sizes. These policy objectives and the
ability of the regulators to monitor and assess information regarding the performance of multibank holding companies place regulators in a position to take corrective action prior to a bank's
insolvency. Taking corrective action could help to maintain the
balance between public confidence and market discipline. Presently, however, regulators, recognizing the unique operational nature of banking subsidiaries in a multibank holding company, have
moved to abort failure either by arranging mergers, recapitalizations, or managed reductions in size. 66 Applying substantive consion would have significantly weakened the correspondent banks. See DEPOsrr INSURANCE FOR THE NINETIES, supra note 46, at 258-62.
Between 1986 and 1991, the FDIC detennined that only four banks were "too big to
fail" and protected all depositors. Those institutions were First National Bank & Trust Co,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (1986); FirstRepublic Bank, Dallas, Texas (1988); MCorp,
Houston, Texas (1989); and Bank of New England, Boston, Massachusetts (1991). The cost
of protecting the uninsured depositors of these institutions was less than one billion dollars
or about 3.5% of the FDIC's total insurance losses over this time period. See "Too Big to
Fail," supra note 63, at 82-83 (testimony of L. William Seidman, Chainnan, FDIC).
6S The interrelationship of the country's payments system and the banking industry
raises concerns about the systemic effect of a multibank holding company failure. The
stability and integrity of the payments system operates as a check and balance on the financial viability of other financial institutions. When parties to a transaction are at risk, there
is an effect on the flow of liquidity and credit at a financial institution. The financial market senses and reacts to perceived instabilities of financial institutions. See Wilmarth,
supra note 63, at 997-1002.
66 See Bovenzi & Muton, supra note 63, at 2-3. Systemic risk also raises issues of economic inefficiency and equity. To the extent that institutions are reckless, abuse weak in-
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solidation in the banking context is an alternative to prior
ineffective attempts to make holding companies accountable
through parental guarantees.
III.

THE PRECURSORS: THE NET WORTH MAINTENANCE
AGREEMENT AND THE SOURCE OF
STRENGTH CONDITION

A.

Background·

Holding companies seeking to own thrift and banking subsidiaries are subject to approval of the formation, structure, and operation of the resulting entity by the appropriate regulatory agency.67
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 ("BHeA") grants the
FRB supervisory control over bank and nonbank subsidiaries.68
The Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967
("SLHCA")69 grants OTS, formerly the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board ("Bank Board"), the same authority over companies acquiring control over and operating thrifts.
stitutions, or make mistakes whose consequences are borne by weak institutions, the
economy absorbs the loss. See Wilmarth, supra note 63, at 986-90.
Similar concerns have not always been expressed by regulators when smaller institutions were at risk. Creditors of smaller failed institutions may not be protected from losses
because the regulators evaluate the impact of the financial losses as minimal. Obviously,
this raises issues of equity. Take, for example, New York City's Freedom National Bank,
an institution founded by African Americans in the 1950s. Freedom National Bank had
one branch in Brooklyn serving a large African American clientele of individuals and charitable organizations, many of whom had deposit accounts exceeding the $100,000 coverage
limit. It was not owned by a holding company. Although the FDIC ultimately used an
"essentially" finding, recognizing that the protection of the uninsured deposit customers
was essential to the interests of the insurance fund, the original financial package did not
cover the uninsured claims because the FDIC did not consider the failure of Freedom
National Bank to present a systemic risk. See Failure of the Bank of New England: Hearings Before the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Comm., 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(1991) [hereinafter Failure of the Bank of New Eng/and] (testimony of L. William Seidman,
Chainnan, FDIC); Stephanie Strom, FDIC Offers Aid Plan for Minority Owned Bank,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1991, at A20.
In January 1991, about two months after the failure of the Freedom National Bank,
the Bank of New England, a multibank holding company system with subsidiary banks in
Massachusetts, Maine, and Connecticut, and assets totaling $22.9 billion, failed. The FDIC
detennined that the systemic risk of that failure required uninsured depositors to be protected. Failure of the Bank of New Eng/and, at 7.
67 See generally Clark, supra note 32; Fischel et aI., supra note 37.
68 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.c. § 1841-50 (1988)).
69 Savings and Loan Holding Company Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255,
82 Stat. 5 (amending 12 U.S.c. § 1730a) (repealed 1989). With the adoption of FIRREA in
1989, Congress replaced § 1730a with new provisions regarding savings and loan holding
companies. See 12 U.S.c. § 1467a (Supp. V 1993).
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Each regulatory agency currently has regulations implementing parental guarantees. 70 As part of the approval process for acquiring a controlling interest in a thrift, regulators inquire into the
"financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the
[holding] company and [savings and loan association] involved."71
To carry out this statutory provision, the Bank Board and the FRB
created a type of parental guarantee to protect banks and thrifts
against potential abuse by parent companies.
For the FRB, the regulatory tool is the source of strength condition. For the Bank Board, it is the net worth maintenance agreement. Both regulatory tools have the same effect: They require the
parent company to maintain the acquired subsidiary's net worth by
infusing capital when the sUbsidiary fails to meet its minimum capital requirements. Thus, the bank and thrift regulators interpreted
these statutory provisions as an extension of the government's authority to inquire into the financial resources and future prospects
of corporations attempting to acquire federally insured institutions.72 After a brief discussion of the policy supporting each regu70 The FRB and formerly the Bank Board, now OTS, evaluate the projected compliance of banks and thrifts with regulatory capital requirements. To protect the regulated
subsidiary and to avoid ownership by unstable or weak holding companies that would not
manage efficiently a banking subsidiary, both agencies have legi~lative delegation from
Congress to evaluate a potential parent company's current and future financial ability to
assist the bank or thrift in maintaining that capital standard. See 12 U.S.c. § 1467a(e)(2)
(Supp. V 1993) (thrifts); 12 U.S.c. § 1842(c) (1988) (banks).
71 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(e)(2) (Supp. V 1993); see also id. § 1842(c) (establishing similar
,
.
.
criteria for bank acquisitions).
.
. Under the regulatory scheme, QTS approval of the acquisition of companies acquiring
their first federally insured institution is required unless it finds that "the financial and
managerial resources and future prospects of the company and association involved to be
such that acquisition would be detrimental to the association or [an] insurance risk to the
corporation.~' Id. § 1467a(e)(1)(B); see also Kan~b Servs., Inc. v. FSLIC, 650.F.2d 78 (5th
Cir. 1981) (affirming the FSLIC's imposition of a dividend restriction as a condition of
purchasing two savings and loan associations). In addition to the acquisition approval of
thrifts, the prior scheme gave the FSLIC authority to deal with' in~olvent thrifts "as it
deems appropriate," 12 U.S.C. §§ 1729(b)(1)(A), 1729(c) (1988) (repealed 1989); to make
contracts, id. § 1725(c)(3) (repealed 1989); and to issue cease and desist orders to enforce
written agreements, id. § 1730(e)(1) (repealed 1989). These provisions of SLHCA are unambiguous statements that the regulators may use a compendium of supervisory powers as
necessary to ensure the safety and soundness of financial institutions.
It is also well-established that the BHCA confers on the FRB broad supervisory powers. See Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 365 (1986). This
power includes the authority to establish minimum capital requirements for bank holding
companies, 12 U.S.c. § 3907 (1988); to issue capital directives to bank holding companies,
id.; to conduct financial examinations of bank holding companies and their subsidiaries, id.
§ 1844(c); and, to order bank holc\ing companies to divest themselves of a nonbank subsidiary, id. § 1843(c).
72 The OTS and FRB have interpreted the statutes to permit net worth maintenance
agreements and the source of strength condition. As administrative agencies charged with
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latory tool, an evaluation follows of the merits of the claim that the
source of strength condition is beyond the statutory authority of
the FRB and that an implied net worth maintenance obligation (as
opposed to an express one) is unenforceable because of vagueness.
These claims have arisen because parent companies were not willing after acquisitions to make the cash infusions needed to maintain the capital requirements of subsidiary thrift and banking
institutions. Given the vague statutory language authorizing the
agencies' use of the specific regulatory tools, the opposition of parent companies to the use of these tools is legitimate.
1.

Net Worth Maintenance Agreements

The financial crisis in the thrift industry during the 1970s and
1980s required thrift regulators to develop regulatory tools to avoid
liquidating marginally capitalized thrifts.73 Under the regulatory
scheme in place at the time,74 the Bank Board developed a policy
requiring potential acquirors of FSLIC-insured institutions to execute a net worth maintenance agreement protecting the insurance
fund from losses.
enforcing a statutory scheme, judicial review of the agency's construction is governed
under the deference standard pronounced in the oft cited Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 842 (1984). The Chevron rule requires that a
court reviewing an administrative agency's construction of a statute adopt the agency's
construction unless "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." [d. at
842. In the absence of a specific legislative directive, the Chevron rule implies a congressional delegation to construe the statute. [d. at 843-44.
Chevron distinguishes between the level of judicial deference accorded to an administrative agency's interpretation depending upon whether the statutory construction is explicit or implicit. The reviewing court must apply the standard of "arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute" when there is an explicit statutory gap for the agency to
address. [d. at 844. The reviewing court's deference is limited to a "reasonable [agency]
interpretation" when there is an implicit statutory gap delegated to the agency. [d.
Whether there is either an explicit or implicit statutory gap, it is the agency's responsibility
to create the necessary policy, rules, and regulations for a reviewing court to evaluate.
The Chevron analysis requires the reviewing court to make a two-step analysis. The
reviewing court must determine whether Congress has "unambiguously expressed [its] intent" on the "precise question at issue." [d. at 843. To make this determination, the reviewing court may employ "traditional tools of statutory construction." [d. at 843 n.9.
When congressional intent is unambiguously expressed, both the court and the agency are
bound by that interpretation. In the second step, the court's role is limited to determining
the reasonableness of the agency's interpretation. [d. As discussed infra in text at notes
108-22, courts have not viewed the FRB's interpretation of the source of strength doctrine
as reasonable, but have accepted the use of a net worth maintenance agreement if imposed
as a condition at the time of acquisition.
73 In order to resolve the pending failures of insured institutions, acquirors and FSLIC
entered into several different forms of financial and economic assistance. See DEPOSIT
INSURANCE FOR niE NINETIES, supra note 46, at 161-85.
74 12 U.S.c. § 1730a (1988) (repealed 1989).
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The Bank Board issued its first policy statement in 1984 explaining the need for net worth maintenance agreements. 75 The
theory used to support early net worth maintenance agreements
focused on parent company detriments and benefits.76 The Bank
Board's detriment theory was that a financially weakened parent
company, to the detriment of its banking subsidiary, would strip
the subsidiary of its capital, thereby causing insolvency and requiring an outlay of capital from the FSLIC. 77
The Bank Board based its benefit theory on two presump ..
tions.78 The first was that the parent company of a savings and loan
association controlled the business practices of its insured subsidiaries. 79 The second was that the parent company, which may have
been financially troubled itself, benefitted when FSLIC gave financial assistance to recapitalize a failing subsidiary.80
Based on these presumptions, thrift regulators concluded that
when the federally insured financial institution receives financial
. assistance from FSLIC, the parent company receives an indirect
benefit. Thus, the cash infusion from ~SLIC that enhances the
thrift's capital base and promotes depositor confidence protects the
parent company from financial weakness or instability. By requir75 See 49 Fed. Reg. 41,237, 41,241 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 543, 544, 552,
562,571); see also Office of Regulatory Activities, Thrift Bull. No.5, at 1,2 (Oct. 19,1988)
[hereinafter Thrift Bull. No.5] (requiring modified capital maintenance commitments for
all acquisitions of FSLIC-insured institutions), rescinded by Office of Thrift Supervision,
Thrift Bull. No. 5a, at 1 (Apr. 12, 1990) [hereinafter Thrift Bull. No. 5a].
76 Regulatory Capital Maintenance Obligations of Acquirors of Insured Institutions, 53
Fed. Reg. 31,761 (1988) [hereinafter Capital Maintenance Obligations].
77 There is empirical evidence that suggests that institutions with weakened capital usuany become insolvent. See MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 14, at X-2.
Not only do undercapitalized thrifts have a smaller "cushion" to absorb losses, but the
managers of undercapitalized thrifts have greater incentives to take risks because of the
moral hazard of deposit insurance. See H.R. REP. No. 54(1), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 298
(1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 94 ("If capital levels are too low, managers may
be willing to take excessive risks because of the perception that the FSLIC insurance fund
will pay a substantial portion of the costs if the gamble fails."); H.R. REP. No. 54(1), at 544,
reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 336 ("Undercapitalized thrifts simply have no incentive
not to take excessive risks with insured deposits.") (statement of Reps. Schumer, Morrison,
Roukema, Gonzalez, Vento, McMillen, and Hoagland). Some commentators suggest that
the absence of risk-based insurance premiums encourages excessive risk taking. See
GEORGE J. BENSTON, AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE SAVINGS AND LoAN ASSOCIATION FAILURES 174 (1986). But see Howell E. Jackson, The Superior Performance of Savings and Loan Associations with Substantial Holding Companies, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 405
(1993) (using statistics to argue that savings and loan institutions owned by holding companies do not suffer a detriment because of parent company ownership and, indeed, usually
perform better).
78 See Capital Maintenance Obligations, supra note 76, at 31,761.
79 [d.
80 [d.
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ing a capital infusion from the parent company prior to the use of
insurance funds, the Bank Board encouraged the parent company's
prudential management of the insured institution. 81
In 1988, the Bank Board issued a second policy statement,
Thrift Bulletin 5. 82 This second policy statement acknowledged
that the requirement of a cash infusion might deter potential acquirors. The agency began looking for alternatives to the net
worth maintenance agreement to enforce an acquirer's obligations
to support its insured institution and to effectively protect the
FSLIC. 83 Specifically, 'the Bank Board allowed acquirors of thrifts
to negotiate a maximum amount of cash that they would be obligated to spend to maintain the thrift's capital. 84
After FIRREA, OTS, the Bank Board's successor, again modified its policy on parental guarantees in 1990 and 1991. Now,OTS
requires an agreement from the parent company only when the
thrift being acquired has failed to meet fully phased-in capital requirements. The agency inferred that this change was consistent
with and followed from FIRREA's policy that savings and loan associations achieve FIRREA's capital levels as soon as possible, but
no later than January 1, 1995. 85
[d.
Thrift Bull. No.5, supra note 75.
83 A clear down side of the early policy was that it discouraged potential acquirors. [d.
The crisis in the savings and I~an industry during the late 1980s and the specific need to
attract acquirors for failing institutions accounts for the regulators' abandonment of early,
open-ended net worth maintenance agreements as a condition to acquisition. Few individuals and corporations were interested in making an open-ended commitment as a condition of acquisition of a financial institution. The need to attract acquirors during the thrift
crisis when the FSLIC was insolvent resulted in the change in policy in 1988 discontinuing
the open-ended net worth maintenance agreement. In its stead, acquirors could negotiate
with regulators for either a net worth maintenance agreement limited in amount and duration or a "pre-nuptial agreement" that gave the regulators control of the federally insured
subsidiary if its capital position fell beneath the minimum capital requirements. [d.
84 Under the 1988 policy, FSLIC redefined and limited the maximum amount of capital
infusion required under the net worth maintenance agreement. The aggregate amount of
the infusion-which could be required at a single time or in multiple infusions-would be
limited or capped at a specified amount in the agreement. Also, the net worth maintenance agreement must be evidenced by a separate writing. [d.
85 See Thrift Bull. No. 5a, supra note 75, at 1. OTS issued Thrift Bulletin No. 5a in
April 1990, which set the maximum liability for an acquiror under a limited net worth
maintenance agreement as the difference between the institution's capital immediately following the transaction and the institution'S fully phased-in capital requirements as of the
same date. [d. at 2; see Paul L. Lee, Liability of Bank Holding Companies, Savings and
Loan Holding Companies and Their Affiliates for Failed Bank and Thrift Subsidiaries, in
COUNSELLING CREDITORS OF BANK AND THRIFTS: DEALING WITH THE FDIC AND RTC
(PLI Com. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. A4-4323, 1991).
OTS modified its policy on net worth maintenance agreements again in 1991. See
Office of Thrift Supervision, Thrift Bull. No. 38-3a (Nov. 19, 1991). The new policy in
81

82
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2.

The Source a/Strength Condition
The FRB chose as its parental guarantee the source of
strength condition. Using § 3(c) of the BHCA, the agency exercised its authority to impose the condition as a part of the approval
process of a holding company's acquisition of a banking subsidiary.86 Before the FRB issued its policy statements elaborating its
views on the source of strength doctrine, a potential acquiror challenged the FRB's statutory authority to impose the condition. In
Board 0/ Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp.,87 the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the doctrine as an integral part of the
FRB's exercise of its regulatory authority.88
After the Lincolnwood decision, the FRB promulgated regulations on the source of strength condition. Those regulations
Thrift Bull. No. 38-3a requires either a capital maintenance agreement or !l "pre-nuptial
agreement" only if the acquired thrift has failed to meet its fully phased-in regulatory capital requirements. It also requires that persons or companies subject to capital maintenance
obligations notify OTS before divesting control. See 12 C.F.R. § 567 (1994).
A limited capital net worth maintenance agreement expires after five years or when
fully phased-in capital requirements exist for eight consecutive quarters. A prenuptial
agreement becomes effective when the institution's capital declines below 2% of net assets.
It gives an officer of OTS the right to vote the securities of the institution. This voting only
occurs respecting certain actions (e.g., to remove and replace the board of directors of the
institution), or to dispose of any or all of the securities of the institution owned by the
acquiror in the event the institution's regulatory capital declines below a specified percentage of an institution's liabilities or assets. See Michael S. Helfer et aI., Net Worth Maintenance Actions, in LITIGATII':IG FOR AND AGAINST THE FDIC AND THE RTC 1993 (PLI
Com. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. A4-4429, 1993).
'
86 The FRB based its authority on § 3(c) ofthe BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993), and the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act ("FISA"), which governs "unsafe
and unsound" banking practices. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1988).
87 439 U.S. 234 (1978). In Lincolnwood, four individual shareholders who controlled
86% of the voting stock of a bank applied to form a bank holding company. Their proposed transaction would have transferred ali of the assets and liabilities of the bank to the
holding company. The shareholders then would exchange their shares in the bank for
shares in the holding company. The transaction's financing would require that the holding
company assume $3.7 million of debt that the shareholders had incurred previously to finance their interest in the bank; the holding company would then use dividends received
on the bank stock to retire the acquisition debt over a 12-year period. To raise additional
capital, the shareholders contemplated that the holding company would undertake a $1.5
million note issue, using the proceeds to finance the holding company's purchase of newly
issued stock. Id. at 237-38.
.88 In the Lincolnwood decision, the FRB denied an application to form a bank holding
company because the holding company could not serve 'as a source of strength to the subsidiary bank, even though the formation of the holding company did not cause or exacerbate any financial problems. The Supreme Court upheld the source of strength doctrine
based on the specific statutory language directing the FRB to consider a bank holding
company's financial and managerial resources. The legislative history of the BHCA and
later amendments thereto demonstrated that Congress conferred broad discretion on the
agency to ensure bank safety and the financial soundness of the banking system. Id. at
248-49.
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made failure to comply with the source of strength condition the
basis for an enforcement action. In 1984, the FRB amended Regulation Y to include, specifically, the statutory language of
§ 1842(c).89 Three years later, the FRB issued a policy statement
indicating that a violation of Regulation Y would be grounds for an
enforcement violation. 90
B.

Enforcement

1. FDIC or RTC
Acquirors of federally insured thrifts did not challenge the
Bank Board's authority to condition the approval of thrift holding
company applications on the acquiror's execution of a net worth
maintenance agreement at the time of the approval of the acquisition. It was only when the regulatory agencies began enforcing
these agreements that acquirors mounted objections to their valid89 Regulation Y allows bank holding companies to acquire certain nonbank companies
provided that they offer services that are so closely related to banking as to be an "incident" to banking. 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1994). The policy concern is that the holding company's ownership of non banking subsidiaries will adversely affect its ownership of banking
subsidiaries.
The amendment to Regulation Y stated: "[A] bank holding company shall serve as a
source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary banks and shall not conduct its
operations in an unsafe or unsound manner." Revision of Regulation Y, 49 Fed. Reg. 794,
820 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1»; see also Julius L. Loeser, Bank Holding Company Regulation: The Federal Reserve Board's Recent Revision of Regulation Y,
101 BANKING L.J. 525 (1984); Fallon, supra note 31; James F. Groth, Comment, Can Regulators Force Bank Holding Companies to Bail Out Their Failing Subsidiaries? An Analysis
oJthe Federal Reserve Board's Source-oJ-Strength Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 112 (1991).
90 The 1987 Policy Statement provided, in part, that "[a] bank holding company's failure to meet its obligation to serve as a source of strength to its subsidiary bank(s), including an unwillingness to provide appropriate assistance to a troubled or failing bank will
generally ... result in ... enforcement action." 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707, 15,708 (1987). The
FRB explained the need for this statement by saying that it had "become aware of situations where a bank [had] been threatened with failure notwithstanding the availability of
resources to its parent holding company." [d. at 15,707. Like the Bank Board, the FRB
cited as rationales for the doctrine the benefit that the holding company receives from its
ownership of banking subsidiaries, the need to promote public confidence in the safety and
soundness of the nation's banks, and the reduced risk to the insurance fund. [d.
Consistent with its revised policy statement, which explained that the FRB would pursue enforcement "particularly if appropriate resources are on hand or are available to the
bank holding company on a reasonable basis," id. at 15,708, the FRB chose not to enforce
its source of strength regulation against Hawkeye Bancorporation, an Iowa muItibank
holding company. Although the FRB initially ordered the holding company to inject $1.2
million into a failing subsidiary, it dismissed the charges prior to the beginning of a scheduled administrative hearing. The FRB's rationale for the dismissal was based apparently
on the severe financial condition of the bank holding company, which was unable to fulfill
its obligations to its creditors. See Lisabeth Weiner, Fed Drops Case Against Hawkeye,
AM. BANKER, May 4, 1987, at 11; Fallon, supra note 31, at 1369.
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ity.91 The FDIC or the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC")92
have sought to enforce net worth maintenance agreements by arguing that the acquirors entered into a contract with the Bank Board
to maintain the thrift's net worth at the levels required by the insurance regulations. 93 The FDIC and RTC proceeded under a contract theory because, as the receiver or conservator of a troubled or
failed thrift, the agencies may pursue common law claims on behalf
of the thrift. They do not have the authority to pursue regulatory
enforcement actions against the insolvent thrifts.94 To the extent
that the FDIC or RTC can successfully prove that the acquiror
91 Estimates reveal that several hundred net worth maintenance agreements exist that
arguably could be enforced by the agencies. See Rosemary Stewart, Enforcement of Capital Maintenance Pacts Strained by Failure, Uncertainty, Unfairness, AM. BANKER, Mar. 19,
1991, at 4.
92 The RTC is the government agency created by FIRREA to receive and dispose of
the assets of failed thrifts. See 12 U.S.c. § 1441a(b) (Supp. V 1993).
93 The applicable regulation was 12 c.F.R. § 563.13 (1989).
94 Section 401(f) of FIRREA is a "savings provision" which provides that the abolishment of the FSLIC does not affect the validity of FSLIC's rights under any section of TItle
IV of the National Housing Act. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 401(f), 103 Stat. 183, 354 (1989)
(reprinted in 12 U.S.c. § 1437 note (Supp. V 1993»; see also § 401(g)(1), 103 Stat. at 35657 (similar "savings provision" relating to FHLBB). Thus, the OTS, FDIC, or RTC may
succeed FSLIC as a party-in-interest in enforcing these agreements. OTS takes the position that when FSLIC was abolished, FIRREA transferred its regulatory and enforcement
authority over federally insured thrifts to OTS as well as FSLIC's net worth maintenance
regulations. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(1)(D) (requiring OTS to promulgate regulations by
November 7, 1989 prescribing uniformly applicable capital standards for all savings associations). The new capital regulations, found in 12 C.F.R. § 567 (1994), replaced the
former net worth maintenance regulations found at 12 C.F.R. § 563.13 (1989). See Regulatory Capital, 54 Fed Reg. 46,845, 46,847 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 561, 563, &
567).
OTS has chosen to enforce net worth maintenance agreements only when they have a
document so labeled. The agency then proceeds under 12 U.S.c. § 1818(b)(1) (Supp. V
1993) to enforce the net worth maintenance agreement, which provides in part:
If ... the agency has reasonable cause to believe that the depository institution
or any institution-affiliated party ... is violating or has violated, or the agency
has reasonable cause to believe that the depository institution or any institution-affiliated party is about to violate, a law, rule, or regulation, or any condition
imposed in writing by the agency in connection with the granting of any application or other request by the depository institution or any written agreement entered into with the agency, the agency may issue and serve upon the depository
institution or such party a notice of charges in respect thereof.... [T]he agency
may issue and serve upon the depository institution or the institution-affiliated
party an order to cease and desist from any such violation or practice. Such
order may, by provisions which may be mandatory or otherwise, require the
depository institution or its institution-affiliated parties to cease and desist from
the same, and, further, to take affirmative action to correct the conditions resulting from any such violation or practice.
[d. (emphasis added).
The OTS, the FRB, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC administer this
provision.
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owed an obligation to the Bank Board, the FDIC or RTC can increase the assets of the thrift's estate available to its creditors. 95
In these cases, the FDIC or RTC argued that the thrift is a
third party beneficiary to an enforceable contract between the
Bank Board and the thrift's acquirors, thus making the FDIC or
RTC the successor-in-interest.96 The regulatory agencies faced two
impediments in asserting this claim. First, the success of the third
party beneficiary claim depended on the existence of an enforceable contract. Second, the FDIC or RTC had to demonstrate that
they were the intended beneficiary of such an agreement. 97
The least complicated case for the enforcement of a net worth
maintenance obligation is when the acquirors and FSLIC entered
into a separate agreement or express net worth maintenance obligation. 98 In the absence of such an agreement, the agencies have
relied on various other documents executed at the time of the acquisitiol1 to prove the existence of an implied contract. 99
95 12 U.S.C. § IB21(d)(2)(A)(I) (Supp. V 1993) (providing that the FDIC, as conservator or receiver, succeeds to all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the insured depository
institution); id. § 1441a(b)(4)(A) (similar provision applying to RTC).
96 The opinions of the three federal courts that have considered this issue form the
basis for the discussion that follows. In re Conner Corp., 127 B.R. 775 (E.D.N.C. 1991),
aff'g In re Conner Corp., No. 87-01697-M04, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1751 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
June 20, 1990); RTC v. Tetco, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1159 (W.D. Tex. 1990); FSLIC v. Savers,
Inc., No. LR-C-89-529, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16591 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 13, 1989).
97 This second contention may not be as difficult as the first for the agencies to be
successful on because at least one court has found that if indeed a contractual obligation
exists, it is for the benefit of the insurance fund. The Savers court recognized that as between Savers, Inc. (the acquiror) and FSLIC, Savers Federal (the acquired institution) was
the intended third-party beneficiary, making the insurance fund the successor in interest.
The court, however, denied the regulators' efforts to enforce the contract claim saying that
it would appear to be based on an absence of a private right of action, pursuant to 12
C.F.R. § 563.13 to enforce the obligation. Savers, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16591, at ·2-·3.
98 Those cases in which the court has enforced an obligation based on the existence of
an agreement so labeled include: Guaranty Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F.2d 994 (11th Cir.
1991); Flagship Fed. Sav. Bank v. Wall, 748 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Cal. 1990); Century Fed.
Sav. Bank v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. III. 1990).
99 In the typical acquisition, the acquiror, after extensive negotiations with FSLIC, entered into an "assistance agreement." The resulting agreement set forth FSLIC's promised
monetary contributions and other contractual responsibilities. The potential acquiror and
FSLIC, within statutory and policy constraints, could agree upon various forms of assistance including cash contributions, interest bearing capital rates, indemnification against
potential related claims by third parties, guarantees against losses from specific assets acquired, and greater 'minimum yields on low and nonearning assets. See DEPOSIT INSUR.
ANCE FOR THE NINETIES, supra note 46, at 180-85. The typical agreement also contained
an "integration clause" incorporating any contemporaneous regulations, stipulations, or
letters between the Bank Board and the acquirors. These contemporaneous letters, resolutions, and stipulations of the Bank Board contain the only express references to the acquiror's maintenance of the subsidiary's net' worth. See, e.g., In re Conner Corp., 127 B.R.
at 779-80; Telco, 758 F. Supp. at 1162-63; Savers, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16591 at .1.
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There are two documents that the agencies most often rely
upon to establish the existence of an enforceable contract. One is
the resolution passed by the Bank Board at the time of the acquisition; the other is the commitment letter sent from the acquiror to
the regulatory agency agreeing to comply with the insurance regulations. The FDIC and RTC point to,language in both documents
stating that the institution's net worth is to be maintained "at an
amount equal to the higher of five percent of the total liabilities or
the amount required by § 563.13 of the Insurance Regulations,"loo
as a statement of the specific obligation. 101
The FDIC and RTC's reliance on these documents to establish
a contract is misplaced given that the Bank Board executed the
documents in its regulatory capacity.102 In order for the regulatory
100 The language in the agreement is a verbatim quote of the insurance· regulations in
place at the time. See 12 C.F.R. § 563.13 (1987).
101 The acquirors argue that the documents are overly vague and too indefinite to be
enforceable as contracts because they neither specify the amount of the obligation nor its
duration. See In re Conner Corp., 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1751 at *10 (concluding that Conner
"was simply complying with the regulatory requirements"); Tetco, 758 F. Supp. at 1163
(finding no "independent contractl.!al obligations"); Savers, 1989 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 16591
at *2 (finding "no contract at all"). These same courts noted the absence of documentation
to prove the existence of an agreement and found that mutual assent was lacking. See, e.g.,
In re Conner Corp., 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1751 at *9 (finding no meeting of the minds);
Tetco, 758 F. Supp. at 1162-63 (noting that the record surrounding the application procedures was unclear). Courts also disposed of the cases by finding that the federal receiver
did not qualify as a third party beneficiary under applicable contract law. See, e.g., In re
Conner Corp., 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1751 at *12-*13; cf. Savers, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16591 at *3 (reaching a similar result under Arkansas law); Securities Fed. Sav. v. OTS, 747
F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Fla. 199O) (finding that an intent to contract existed because the parties
entered into extensive negotiations regarding the infusion of capital into the thrift to avoid
the appointment of a receiver).
Even if the agreements are not enforceable as contracts, they are the type of regula~ory agreements that the Bank Board could require as part of its enforcement action. See
In re Conner: Corp., 127 B.R. at 779-80 (distinguishing for contract law purposes net worth
maintenance obligations imposed pursuant to holding company applications from commitments negotiated in settlement of enforcement actions).
102 In the "goodwill" cases, the agencies have argued that these same documents do not
constitute a contract. In certain circumstances, FSLlC granted a goodwill forbearance,
which permitted the acquirors to include goodwill, an intangible asset, in the calculation of
capital for the purpose of satisfying the institution's regulatory capital requirements.
Under the forbearance, an acquiror could amortize goodwill usually for a period of between 25 to 40 years. The agency also agreed to forbear from imposing sanctions if the
institution failed to meet its capital requirements under Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles ("GAAP"). FIRREA phased out the use of goodwill to satisfy the minimum
capital requirements for savings institutions. See 12 U.S.c. § 1464(t}(3}(A} (Supp. V
1993}. The acquirors then instituted court actions claiming that FlRREA and its implementing regulations constituted a breach of contract. Although some acquirors had specific documents to show the existence of such an agreement (e.g., FSLlC Assistance
Agreements, Forbearance Letters, and Conversion Agreements), many argued that a de
facto forbearance existed because the transaction was based on GAAP. Essentially, the
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orders to represent a contract, there must have been a commercial
transaction between the Bank Board and the acquirors. However,
the commercial transaction was between the acquiror and the
thrift. The Bank Board's role was solely as regulator-to evaluate
the holding company's internal and external financial status to ensure that the holding company's ownership would not affect the
thrift adversely and to enforce the agreement if necessary. To argue that the provisions of the resolutions are contractually binding
on the parent company would mean that the regulatory agency has
assumed contractual obligations simply by exercising its regulatory
authority. 103
Federal regulations govern the Bank Board's approval or rejection of acquisition applications. Therefore, when the Bank
Board reviews an acquisition application, the regulations constrain
the Bank Board's actions. It is artificial to view the terms of these
documents relating to the acquisition-the acquisition agreement,
the Bank Board resolution, the commitment letter-together or
separately as implying contractual terms. The documents do no
more than state the governing regulations, making them a regulatory agreement that can be enforced by the appropriate agency,

acquirors argued that the forbearance was more than a statement of regulatory intent regarding accounting treatment. The FDIC and OTS adopted the position that the regulatory statement was not an agreement because it was not executed by both parties, did not
contain mutual promises, and was not supported by consideration. See ltansohio Say.
Bank v. OTS, 967 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Carteret Say. Bank, FA v. OTS, 963 F.2d 567
(3d Cir. 1992); Far West Fed. Say. Bank v. OTS, 951 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1991); Guaranty
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1991); Franklin Fed. Say. Bank v. OTS, 927
F.2d 1332 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 370 (1991); cf Olympic Fed. Say. & Loan v.
OTS,903 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding that there could be no implied in fact contract
without express statutory authority which was lacking in FIRREA).
103 The commitment letters, which are the acquiror's acknowledgment that the Bank
Board's supervisory process binds it, are superfluous. By submitting an application to the
Bank Board for approval, the acquiror became subject to the Bank Board's supervisory
authority. t2 U.S.C. § 1730a (1988) (repealed 1989). The letters do no more than serve as
further acknowledgement that the acquiror, like its subsidiary, is subject to the Bank
Board's supervisory powers. But see Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors, 849 F.2d
1499, 1501 n.t (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[T]hese letters ... are clearly a binding portion of the
Board's action on Northeast's application, conditions imposed as part of the Board's duty
to consider bank holding company applications under 12 U.S.c. § 1842(c).") The requirement that the acquirors enter into a net worth maintenance agreement was no more than
the acquiror's compliance with the existing regulatory policy. The acquiror, because it was
subject to the agency's jurisdiction, was also subject to whatever tenns the Bank Board in
its regulatory capacity detennined were necessary to impose. As the Savers court stated:
"[A] 'contract' to do what one is already required by law to do is realIy no contract at all."
Savers, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16591 at "'3.
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but not a contract that can be enforced by either party in case of a
breach. 104

2. FRB

In MCorp Financial, Inc. v. Board of Governors (MCorp),105
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated the FRB's authority
to enforce the source of strength condition against a holding company as unsafe and unsound banking practices. MCorp, a multibank holding company, challenged the authority of the FRB to
require it to make capital infusions into its failing subsidiary banks
after an acquisition. 106 .
Federal court review of the FRB's authority to impose the
source of strength condition after acquisition occurred for the first
time in 1988. MCorp, a multibillion dollar bank holding company
that owned twenty-five subsidiary banks in Texas, began experiencing financial difficulties that threatened the subsidiary banks. The
parent company had substantial assets which led the FRB to issue a
temporary cease and desist order directing MCorp to use all of its
assets to provide capital support to its subsidiary banks in need of
additional capita1. 107 When MCorp failed to comply with the FRB
order, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC")108
declared twenty of MCorp's twenty-five subsidiaries insolvent and
closed them. The FRB then initiated an administrative action (a
source of strength proceeding) against MCorp claiming that it had
failed to give financial support to the five remaining subsidiary
104 See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Bargaining for Justice: An Examination of the Use and Limits of Conditions by the Federal Reserve Board, 74 IOWA L. REV. 837, 879-98 (1989). Professor Aman argues that administrative agencies use conditions to expand their
supervisory powers in areas where the reach of their enforcement powers under the law is
unclear. Under this theory, the net worth maintenance agreement is a nonnegotiable term
to which the acquiror may either consent or refuse consent under likely penalty of the
agency's denial of approval of the acquisition.
105 900 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 502 U.S. 32 (1991).
106 That policy statement mandated that after approval of the acquisition application, a
parent company must agree to use its available managerial and financial resources for the
benefit of its failing subsidiary banks. See 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707, 15,708 (1987).
107 The FRB also issued two other temporary cease-and-desist orders charging that the
parent company was engaged in unsafe and unsound banking practices that jeopardized
the financial condition of the 25 subsidiary banks. The first order forbid MCorp from
declaring or paying any dividends without the prior approval of the Board. The second
order forbid MCorp from dissipating any of its nonbank assets without the prior approval
of the Board. MCorp, 502 U.S. at 34.
108 The
is the chartering agency for national banks. In this capacity, it makes the
decision to close a national bank on a finding of insolvency. 12 U.S.c. § 191 (Supp. V
1993).
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banks. Within a short time, MCorp filed for voluntary
bankruptcy.l09
The federal district court enjoined the FRB from continuing
its administrative source of strength proceeding on the ground that
the bankruptcy code's automatic stay provision barred the FRB's
actionsYo This decision prohibited the FRB from pursuing its
"source of strength" proceedings against MCorp and the FRB appealed this decision to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals partially. reversed, holding that judicial review provisions of 12 U.S.c. § 1818
deprived th~ district court of jurisdiction until the FRB completed
the administrative proceedings.l11 The Fifth Circuit evaluated two
grounds of the FRB's' alleged authority: (1) unsafe and unsound
banking practices;112 and (2) Regulation y'113 After evaluating
both grounds, the .Fifth Circuit concluded that the FRB exceeded
its authority when it adopted the source of strength policy statement. Specifically, the court found Regulation Y would require
the parent company to waste its corporate assets and the FRB did
not have the authority to require .that. 114
An "unsafe and unsound practice," as defined by this court,
would be any action or lack of action that is "contrary to generally
accepted standards of prudent operation. "115 The court concluded
that capital injections on the scale the FRB would require would in
tum require MCorp to disregard its own separate corporate statuS.1l6 Thus, the court determined that MCorp's refusal to transfer
funds to its troubled subsidiaries was not an "unsafe and unsound

109 MCorp filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against the OTS. The district
court ruled that the bankruptcy court had primary jurisdiction over the parent company.
In re MCorp, 101 B.R. 483 (S.D. Tex. 1989), rev'd in part and vacated in part sub nom.
MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board of Governors (MCorp), 900 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd on
jurisdictional grounds, 502 U.S. 32 (1991).
.
110 The district court granted MCorp's motion for a preliminary injunction against the
Federal Reserve Board. The court reasoned that the bankruptcy court, and not the Federal Reserve Board, must have primary jurisdiction over the company's actions because at
that time the company was to have an effective plan of restructuring under the bankruptcy
laws. MCorp, 101 B.R. at 485-88.
111 MCorp, 900 F.2d at 854-57.
112 Id. at 862-64.
113 Id. at 860-62.
114 Id. at 863.
115 Id. (quoting Gulf Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 651 F.2d 259, 264 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied 458 U.S. 1121 (1982».
116 Id.
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practice" because it would, among other things, amount to a wasting of MCorp's assets violating its duty to its shareholders.u 7
Under Regulation Y, the court denied the FRB's assertion
that it had authority to take supervisory action to require a holding
company to make financial assistance to a troubled subsidiary.lls
The court ruled that the FRB has supervisory control over bank
holding companies and bank subsidiaries as well as the power to
approve the acquisition of banks by a holding company, but the
FRB "does not [have] the authority to consider the financial and
managerial soundness of subsidiary banks" after issuing an approval of an acquisition to a holding company.119 Thus,' the court
found that the FRB had exceeded its' statutory authority by
promulgating and enforcing its source of strength doctrine, as set
forth in Regulation Y and the 1987 Policy Statement.12°
The Fifth Circuit, in a footnote, indicated its approval of net
worth maintenance agreements as an appropriate means of implementing the source of strength policy statement. 12,I Thus, the court
was indicating that the FRB's source of strength requirement might
be acceptable if, like the net worth maintenance agreement, the
requirement is imposed as a condition to acquisition rather than
simply an arbitrary imposition applied at some subsequent point of
difficulty.122
3. Present Status of the Source of Strength Condition and the
Net Worth Maintenance Agreement'
Each of the regulatory agencies-the FRB, OTS, FDIC, and
RTC-has experienced difficulty enforcing parental guarantees.
Id.
The Fifth Circuit also expressly rejected the FRB's interpretation under a Chevron
analysis. Id. at 862-64. The court specifically found that no statute authorized the FRB to
require a bank holding company to make capital infusions into its subsidiary banks. Id. at
863; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 40S, 444,-61 (1989). Professor Sunstein argues that a Chevron analysis does not apply
to an administrative agency's determination of its own jurisdiction.
119 MCorp, 900 F.2d at 861.
120 Id. at 864.
121 Id. at 862 n.S.
122 The FRB appealed to the Supreme Court. See S02 U.S. at 32. In its review, the
Court did not reach the merits of the applicability of the source of strength condition.
Instead, it found that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of
the parent company's claim. Citing the statutory scheme found in 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)
(1988), the Court held that the FRB administrative proceeding was not final, thereby precluding review of either the regulation or its application. MCorp, 502 U.S. at 42-4S. For a
recent court's view of the FRB's authority to regulate the activities of a holding company's
subsidiary banks, see Citicorp v. Board of Governors, 936 F.2d 66, 73-76 (2d Cir. 1991).
117

118
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The FRB and the Bank Board have relied on identical statutory
language to create similar parental guarantees. The FRB and OTS
have been unsuccessful in defending court challenges to the enforceability of parental guarantees. 123
For the FRB, when the source of strength condition or net
worth maintenance agreement can be imposed on the parent company, such as MCorp, is an issue of notice and of whether the statute provides sufficient basis for the FRB to require the holding
company to violate its duty to shareholders without more notice.
To the extent that the holding company should be subjected to continuous scrutiny of its financial viability by the FRB, the regulatory
scheme, in addition to the statutory language, should so specify.
Quite simply, the regulations and the statute should explicitly require the holding company to make these infusions. Sufficient notice would require no more· than imposing the condition on the
acquirors at the time of the acquisition. Without imposing this condition prior to requiring the capital infusion, a court reviewing the
FRB's actions, and adopting the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit,
might find that a fiduciary duty to shareholders and corporate separateness would be violated when prior to the FRB's issuing an
administrative order, a holding company has not agreed specifically
to make additional capital infusions. 124
The Bank Board's use of a net worth maintenance agreement
seems to resolve the notice issue in that the agency's regulatory
scheme makes clear that continuing assessment of the holding company's viability will occur.12S However, this still may not make the
agreements enforceable. Courts have been reluctant to find im123 The OTS has successfully enforced obligations that are express, usually in separately
labeled agreements. See supra note 117.
124 The FRB continues to evaluate applications of holding companies for the acquisition
of a bank under the source of strength doctrine. The FRB has rejected application wholly
or in part on the basis of the source of strength doctrine. See FNBA Holding Co., 75 Fed.
Res. Bull. 711 (1989) (application to become an holding company denied because plan to
acquire a bank was financially unsound given the bank's current debt obligation to its present holding company); St. Croix Valley Bancshares, Inc., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 575 (1989)
(holding company's application to purchase another holding company rejected because
projections about future performance were overly optimistic and would affect holding
company's future ability to raise capital); Croesus Partners I, Inc., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 45, 46
(1986) (application to become a bank holding company rejected because applicant "would
not have sufficient financial flexibility to serve as a source of financial strength to its sub·
sidiary banks in the future").
125 The 1988 Policy statement represented a dramatic change in FSLIC's regulatory policy. The Bank Board required the acquiror to enter into a net worth maintenance agree·
ment as a condition of acquisition only if the institution being acquired failed to meet fully
phased-in capital requirements at the time of the acquisition. See Thrift Bull. No.5, supra
note 75.
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plied contracts and have found that absent a document labeled
"net worth maintenance agreement," there is no enforceable contract between the Bank Board and the acquiring holding company.
Courts would perhaps be more willing to find an implied obligation
if the regulatory scheme made the obligation a specific condition of
acquisition rather than an arbitrary condition imposed when a subsidiary is experiencing a financial crisis. 126
Even when the Bank Board made it clear at the time of acquisition that capital infusions may be required as a condition for approval, holding companies challenged the condition on the grounds that it exceeded the statutory authority of the Bank Board. The
Bank Board and OTS's estoppel defenses against these claims have been rejected by those
courts that have heard them. See, e.g., Wachtel v. OTS,982 F.2d 581, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(holding company and shareholders were not equitably estopped from challenging the order of the OTS on the theory that the savings bank had received regulatory approval only
after agreeing to net worth conditions); see also In re Conner Corporation, 127 B.R. 775
(E.D.N.C. 1991) (agreement by debtor-holding company to maintain net worth of savings
bank at the level required by deposit insurance regulation does not constitute an enforceable contract between the debtor and the FHLBB); RTC v. Tetco, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1159
(W.D. Tex. 1990) (net worth maintenance stipulation included in the FHLBB's resolution
approving the holding company's application for deposit insurance is not a contract condition and no private right of action exists to enforce the regulatory condition under SLHCA
or Change in Control Act).
126 OTS has been successful in bringing administrative actions against acquirors in order
to enforce net worth maintenance agreements of now insolvent thrifts. See In re Akin,
OTS Order No. 90-4009 (Dec. 24, 1990), aff'd, 950 F.2d 1180, 1181 (5th Cir. 1992) (OTS
enforcement proceeding against an individual shareholder who had agreed in writing to a
capital maintenance commitment in order to forestall an earlier enforcement action against
a different thrift in which the shareholder had a controlling interest; OTS ordered individual shareholder to make payment of $19.6 million); In re Wachtel, OTS Order No. AP 9188 (Nov. 20, 1991), petition for review granted, 982 F.2d 581, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (OTS
enforcement proceeding against several defendants, including a holding company, that had
acceded to a capital maintenance obligation imposed as a condition to the Bank Board's
initial approval of the company's acquisition of its thrift subsidiary in 1977; OTS ordered
the defendants to make payments of $5.3 million into federal receivership); see also In re
Firstcorp, Inc., OTS Order No. AP 92-125, 1992 LEXIS 107, at ·32 (Nov. 20, 1992) (ordering a $45 million payment under a capital maintenance commitment).
These enforcement proceedings are based on 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(I) (Supp. V 1993),
which allows OTS to initiate a cease and desist proceeding to enforce a written condition
or agreement. See Kaneb Servs., Inc. v. FSLIC, 650 F.2d 78, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1981) (FSLIC's
authority to impose a dividend restriction as a condition of approval for the acquisition of a
savings and loan subsidiary by a holding company upheld under the broad authority of
FSLIC to regulate acquisitions by the holding company).
To support the order to cease and desist, the OTS must show that, because of the
acquiror's failure to perform according to either the written agreement or condition to
maintain the subsidiary's net worth, the acquiror has been unjustly enriched or has shown a
reckless disregard for its legal obligations. OTS's remedy allows the agency to require the
institution or the party to cease and desist, make restitution, or engage in "affirmative
action." Affirmative action may include giving OTS the power to: restrict the growth of
the institution; dispose of any loan or asset involved; rescind agreements or contracts; employ qualified officers or employees; or take such other action as the banking agency determines to be appropriate. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6) (Supp. V 1993).
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THE PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION PROVISION

Unlike the net worth maintenance agreement or the source of
strength condition, the prompt corrective action provision imposes
a capital maintenance obligation127 on all parent companies and
specifies when the parental guarantee becomes effective, as well as
the amount of the financial commitment. 128 It is intended to remedy the weaknesses of the net worth maintenance agreement and
the source of strength condition by creating an obligation that is
easily enforced.
Section 38(e) of FDICIA sets forth the financial circumstances
under which a parent holding company must provide a capital infusion into its bank subsidiary.129 The basic premise of the regulatory
scheme is that a low level of capital serves as neutral evidence that
an institution is financially troubled. Thus, under the new statutory
127 FDICIA uses the term "capital restoration plan." See 12 U.S.c. § 1831o(b)(2)(C)
(Supp. V 1993). Under FDICIA, when regulators classify a bank as undercapitalized, several discretionary and mandatory corrective intervention actions take place. These corrective interventions increase in severity as the institution's undercapitalization becomes more
critical. Id. § 1831o(f)-(i).
128 All federally insured banks must be categorized according to their capital level as
determined by the relevant capital measures. See supra note 15.
An undercapitalized institution must submit a capital restoration plan to its primary
federal regulator in a timely manner. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993). The
plan must explain in detail how the institution will rebuild capital, specifying year-to-year
target levels for capital gr~wth. See id. § 1831o(e)(2)(B). The plan must be based on realistic assumptions, describe activities that are likely to succeed, and not expose the institution to appreciably increased risk. The plan must also describe the types and levels of
activities in which the institution will engage and contain such other information as regulators require. See id. § 1831o(e)(2)(C)(i).
129 The parent company is identified under the statute as the "company having control
of the institution." Id. § 1831o(e)(2)(C). As a condition for obtaining the regulator's approval of the recapitalization plan, each company having control of an undercapitalized
institution must: (1) guarantee that the undercapitalized institution will comply with its
recapitalization plan until it has been adequately capitalized on average during each of
four consecutive calendar quarters; and (2) provide appropriate assurances of performance. Seeid. § 1831o(e)(2)(C)(ii).
The statute limits the amount of the parent company's liability on its guarantee to the
lesser of: (1) 5% of the depository institution's total assets at the time it becomes undercapitalized, or (b) the amount necessary to bring the institution into compliance with all
capital standards. See id. § 1831o(e)(2)(E)(i); see also 12 C.F.R. § 325.104(h)(I)(i)(B)
(1994).
If there are two or more parent companies, their aggregate liability is similarly limited
to the lesser of 5% of the troubled institution's assets or the compliance total. 12 U.S.c.
§ 1831o(e)(2)(E)(i) (Supp. V 1994). Only companies having control of an undercapitalized
insured depository institution are required to issue the guarantee and to be liable on a
capital restoration plan; other affiliates are not required to guarantee the plan. See id.
§ 1831o(e)(2)(E)(ii).

To ensure a sufficient guarantee, the parent company must also provide "appropriate
assurances of performance." [d. § 1831o(e)(2)(C)(ii).
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provision, capital serves as an indicator that early intervention is
needed to resolve the problems of troubled institutions with minimal loss to the insurance fund. 130
Another articulated premise supporting this statutory provision is that control shareholders, such as parent companies, have a
greater equity share in the institution and, therefore, have more of
an interest than the typical shareholder in monitoring the activities
of the management. l3l When art institution's capital level is low,
management is more likely to take risks with the institution's deposits in order to make a profit. 132 Congress and the FDIC have
recognized that a subsidiary bank's parent company and its shareholders that receive financial assistance from the insurance fund
are unintended but significant beneficiaries' of that financial
assistance. 133
.
.
The prompt corrective action provision has two different
goals. First, there is the cash infusion, which is an initial effort to
stabilize a solvent, but troubled bank subsidiary. The cash assistance required from the parent company is an early effort to
restructure and recapitalize the troubled institution without the financial assistance of the FDIC. 134 Whether the recapitalization
will succeed is uncertain at the time of the infusion. 135 When the
cash infusion is needed, existing shareholders' interests already are
130 Under t~e statute, an undercapitalized institution must submit within 45 days a capital restoration plan and the regulatory agency must review that.plan within 60 days. 12
U.S.c. § 1831o(e)(2)(D)(i)-(ii) (Supp. V 1993); see alSo Richard S. CameJl, Prompt Corrective.Action Under the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991., in LITIGATING FOR AND AGAINST
THE FDIC AND THE RTC (PLI Com. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 625, 1992);
Nina CorteJl, Aspects of Financiallnsti~tions Exposure, in- REsPONSIBILITY OF THE CORPORATE PARENT FOR THE AcrIVITIES OF A SUBSIDIARY BANKS (PLI Com. L. & Prac.
Course Handbook Series No. 706, 1990).
131 The problem of moral hazard of dep~sit insurance increases the opportunities for
managers and owners of a financial institution to engage in ri~ky activity because the losses
created by the risky behavior will be absorbed by the deposit insurance fund. See supra
note 21. The statute prevents an institution from paying dividends or management fees
that cause the institution to become undercapitalized as a result of the distribution. See 12
U.S.c. § 18310(d)(I)(A) (Supp. V 1993). As the Senate Report explains, this provision
"protects the insurance fund by preventing institutions from depleting their capital for the
benefit of their shareholders." See S. REP. No. 167, t02d Cong.,.lst Sess. 35 (1991).
132 See MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 14, at X-I to -5 (drawing a
coroJlary between low supervisory ratings and banks that eventuaJly fail).
133 Low capital levels increase incentives for banks to act recklessly, not prudently, because owners have nothing to lose and everything to win by gambling with insured deposits. See S. REp. No. 167, t02d Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33 (1991). The capital infusion provision
is designed to induce the parent company to decide promptly whether to recapitalize the
institution, seJl it, or stand behind it until it recovers. Id. at 35. .
134 See MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 14, at X-I.
135 See discussion of TAB Holding, Inc., infra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
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diluted. 136 Optimally, the infusion may provide a chance to
restructure and salvage some value for creditors and perhaps
shareholders. If stabilization does not occur, the parent company
can try to arrange a more permanent solution with the FDIC,137
The second goal of the provision is to allow the parent company to make an early, quick decision about its future plans for the
financially troubled subsidiary. If the parent company decides that
it does not want the subsidiary to remain financially viable, the parent company may choose not to guarantee the subsidiary's compliance with its capital restoration plan. 138 This allows the parent
company to voluntarily liquidate the bank or seek its closure.
FDICIA sets the obligation of the parent company to make a
cash infusion into its subsidiary as the least amount needed to bring
the depository institution into compliance with all capital standards
as of the time it fails to comply with its capital restoration plan, or
five percent of the institution's assets at the time it became
undercapitalized. 139
On several key issues, the statutory language and the implementing regulations are unclear. These issues of vagueness concern the obligations of the parent company as well as the
protections that should be afforded an institution that is found to
be capital deficient. These are areas ripe for administrative overreach if not addressed. One of the goals of the FDIC is to take
away the banking regulators' discretion when a financial institution
becomes financially troubled. However, the vagueness of the statute and regulations may give regulators the kind of discretion that
results in harsh enforcement. This will result in disadvantaging the
136 The cash infusion from the parent company presents the opposite effect of the condition of moral hazard-shareholders risk their funds in the hopes that the institution will
return to profitability.
137 This is the most viable alternative for the FDIC because it may either reduce costs or
result in a "costless" solution. See MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 14,
at X-21 to -22. Under the FDIC's traditional resolution alternatives, creditors may receive
reimbursement from the insurance fund. See discussion of the FDIC's resolution alternatives infra part V.
138 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)(2)(C)(ii) (Supp. V 1993). If the parent company fails to guarantee its subsidiary bank's capital plan, it places the bank subsidiary in noncompliance with
the minimum capital requirements.
139 The statute requires that the parent company infuse the amount necessary to bring
the institution into capital compliance "as of the time the institution fails to comply with
[its capital restoration plan.]" [d. § 1831o(e)(2)(E}(i}(II} (Supp. V 1993). Strategically,
the parent company may choose not to guarantee the bank subsidiary's plan so as to limit
the amount of its liability. The parental guarantee is limited to the amount necessary to
bring the institution into compliance at the time that the subsidiary bank fails to comply
with the capital restoration plan. [d.
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regulated entities-the parent company and the troubled financial
institution. 140
The statutory language is vague on several significant issues of
parental liability. For example, the statutory language is unclear as
to whether a parent company is only required to make a single
capital infusion. 141 The statute might require the parent company's
obligation to continue indefinitely. Consider an undercapitalized
financial institution that submits an acceptable capital restoration
plan to the regulatory agency and is adequately recapitalized with
the assistance of cash infusions from the parent company for the
required four consecutive quarters. Three quarters later, in quarter
seven, the financial institution becomes undercapitalized again.
The regulations seem to require the institution to submit another
capital restoration plan, and for the parent company to guarantee
again the institution's performance with the plan for four consecutive quarters. 142
Similarly, an issue that needs clarity is the responsibility of a
parent company when multiple subsidiary banks need financial
assistance. Without establishing options for the parent company,
. the regulations once again give the regulators much discretion in
framing. a remedy to address this dilemma. This type of discretion
may result in an appropriate remedy, and yet, one that was not
contemplated under the statutory scheme. 143
The institution that is declared undercapitalized by the agency
should also be afforded more protection from administrative
abuse. There is currently no procedure in the regulations that pro140 See Lawrence O. Baxter, Administrative and Judicial Review of Prompt Corrective
Action Decisions by Federal Banking Regulators, 7 ADMIN. L.J. 505, 567-73 (1993). Professor Baxter identifies several areas in which enforcing the prompt corrective action provision is unclear and therefore may conflict with other established enforcement procedures.
He argues that a lack of clarity in these areas may lead to administrative overreach by the
enforcing agencies. The troublesome areas of vagueness include the appointment of a receiver, lack of judicial review for the capital classifications, and existing safety and soundness regulations.
141 This issue of continuous liability no doubt raises issues of whether the board of directors of the holding company is exercising its "independent business judgment." See Leonard Bierman & Donald R. Fraiser, The "Source of Strength" Doctrine: Formulating the
Future of America's Financial Markets, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 269, 281-84 (1993) (recommending the repeal of the prompt corrective action provision and replacing it with alternative reforms of the deposit insurance system, interstate banking, market value
accounting, and "early" bank closure).
142 This scenario could continue ad infinitum. However, assuming that the parent company is committed to restoring the subsidiary to financial viability, it may be able to enter
into a contractual agreement with the appropriate regulatory agency to establish reasonable limits on continuous liability. [d. at 278.
143 See Aman, supra note 104, at 883.
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vides for administrative review of the determination of undercapitalization. More importantly, there is no requirement that the
agency create a substantial record from which that determination
can be made. This lack of review means that regulators, following
the congressional mandate for quick intervention, may unfairly
take control of an institution. Without an administrative review
process in place, if the regulatory agency makes an error, the institution loses irreparably.144 Finally, all institutions subject to the
prompt corrective action benefit if there is uniformity among the
various regulatory agencies authorized to enforce this provision. 145
Under the statutory scheme, the parent company is not subject
to any liability should the institution become insolvent without
having received cash infusions from the parent. The absence of
this key provision makes the statute an ineffective remedy for
resolving the problem of undercapitalized institutions. Undoubtedly, the congressional intention in establishing an early intervention remedy like prompt corrective action was to allow the parent
company to make an early decision about whether it would stand
behind a banking subsidiary or allow it to fail. l46 However, this is
an ineffective and unfair solution in those situations in which a parent company may have exercised control over the subsidiary in
such a way that it has become undercapitalized. When it can be
shown, by applying' the tests establishing economic identity discussed in Part VI that a parent company has manipulated an un144' When the chartering agency appoints a conservator or receiver, the courts have long
recognized that the agencies must act swiftly to avoid' further dissipation of assets and to
minimize the public's perception of harm in the financial industry. See, e.g., Telegraph Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 564 F. Supp. 862, 873 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff'd sub. nom. Telegraph
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schilling, 703 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983).
However, in those situations, there is an opportunity for the court to review the agency's
decision. The institution may file a cha\lenge to the appointment in federal district court
resulting in judicial review of the agency's factual findings supporting that decision. See 12
U.S.C. § 203(b)(I) (Supp. V 1993) (a \lowing national banks to cha\lenge appointment of
conservator within 20 days); id. § 1821(c)(7) (allowing federally insured state banks to
challenge appointment of conservator or receiver within 30 days); id. § 1464(d)(2)(B) (allowing federa\ly insured thrifts to challenge appointment of conservator or receiver within
30 days); see also Baxter, supra note 140, at 563-65. This after-the-fact determination justifies the expedient action of the regulators and satisfies the institution's due process concern. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947); Haralson v. FHLBB, 837 F.2d
1123, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ([T]he fact that judicial review is available only after the fact
does not ... render that judicial review constitutionally inadequate. ").
145 The statute gives enforcement authority to "[e]ach appropriate Federal banking
agency." 12 U.S.C. § 18310(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993); see also Jamie C. Mann & Barbara J.
Ellis, Developments in Banking Law: 1992,12 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 1 (1992) (discussing
the need for concerted efforts among the regulatory agencies to ensure fairness in administration of regulations and procedures).
146 See supra note 137.
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dercapitalized banking subsidiary's capital position in such a
manner that a healthy banking subsidiary benefits, the parent company should be held accountable. The only way to make the parent
company accountable is to take away its discretion to make a capital infusion when the institution becomes undercapitalized under
the prompt corrective action standards. Consolidation of the undercapitalized and healthy banking subsidiaries is a better alternative than the capital infusion mandated by the prompt corrective
action provision to address the problem of parent company control
and to protect the resources of the insurance fund.
..
V.

THE RESOLUTION OF FINANCIALLY TROUBLED
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Parental guarantees, because they are mandated by statute,
become an essential element of the FDIC's use of its regulatory
enforcement powers to resolve troubled financial institutions.
Although banks within a multibank holding company are allowed
to transfer funds among themselves,147 it is the FDIC that must pay
for the losses when, as single units, the institutions fail. 148 The
strategy of resolving the financial problems of banks in a multi bank
holding company presents a peculiar problem: How to observe the
formalities of limited liability even though the entities conduct
business as though they are a common corporate unit. The impact
of interaffiliate lending and captive funding both affect the alternatives that the FDIC must choose from in resolving the problem of
providing financial assistance within a multibank holding system.
This Part discusses the traditional ways in which the FDIC has provided financial institution packages to multibank holding company
systems and how those packages have created unavoidable losses
to the insurance fund.
A. Resolution Alternatives
The FDIC has a menu of five alternatives from which to chose
when an institution threatens failure. The FDIC may arra~ge: (1) a
purchase and assumption transaction; (2) open bank assistance; (3)
a deposit pay-off; (4) an insured deposit transfer; or (5) establish a
bridge bank. The purchase and assumption transaction and open
147 12 U.S.c. § 371c-l(a) (Supp. V 1993). The rules governing interaffiliate transactions
permit some transactions without the prior approval of the regulatory agencies. See discussion supra part II.C. .
148 See DEPOSIT INSURANCE FOR THE NINETIES, supra note 46, at 227·29 (describing the
difficulties associated with problem banks in muItibank holding companies).
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bank assistance are usually the most efficient and least costly
alternatives. 149
1.

The Purchase and Assumption Transaction

In a purchase and assumption transaction, some or all of a
failed bank's assets are transferred to an acquiring institution. The
acquiring institution enters into a bidding process with the FDIC.
The acquiror, in effect, merges with the insolvent bank and assumes all of the deposits and general creditor claims. The acquiror
also receives all of the performing assets of the failed bank. The
FDIC makes an offsetting cash payment and also holds all of the
nonperforming assets to liquidate them.150
2. Open Bank Assistance
In an open bank assistance transaction, the FDIC makes a
cash advance or a "loan" to the financial institution. 151 In order to
receive the assistance, the executive management, directors, shareholders, and subordinated debt holders of the holding company
must have suffered a financial impact comparable to what would
have occurred if the bank had actually closed. This means that a
bank holding company, and that holding company's creditors,
should receive no more than they would be entitled to if the failed
bank's assets were liquidated in a deposit pay-off. Open bank
assistance is similar to a purchase and assumption transaction, with
one major difference-the open bank assistance occurs before the
failing bank is technically insolvent. Depositors and general creditors are protected against loss. Additionally, as in a purchase and
assumption transaction, management is usually replaced, bank
stockholders lose their investment, and if a holding company is involved, creditors are not protected by'the FDIC. 152
149

The FDIC is required by statute to choose the least costly alternative. See 12 U.S.c.

§ 1823(c)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1993). Prior to passage of FDICIA in 1991, regulators were free

to ignore that restriction if "the continued operation of [a defaulting bank] ... [was] essential to provide adequate banking services in the community." 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)

(Supp. II 1990) (repealed 1991) (emphasis added). A finding of "essentiality" was required
only if the costs of assisting a bank exceeded the cost of closing or liquidating it. [d.
§ 1823(c)(4)(A)(ii).
150 See MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 14, at 1-30 to -31.
151 The FDIC is authorized to provide open bank assistance "in its sole discretion and
upon such terms and conditions as ... [it] may prescribe." 12 U.S.c. § 1823(c)(I) (1988 &
Supp. V 1994); see also MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 14, at 1-34.
152 The terms and conditions for open bank assistance were established in the FDIC's
1983 policy statement. 48 Fed. Reg. 38,669 (1983). It provided that the FDIC "generally
will not approve any proposal requesting assistance ... unless ... [t]he financial impact on
executive management, directors, shareholders and subordinated debt holders is compara-
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Deposit Pay-Off

The only way that affiliated banks in a multibank holding system can share in the losses is to handle the insolvent bank's failure
as a deposit pay-off or an insured deposit transfer. These approaches are generally more disruptive and costlier. 153160
In a deposit pay-off, the failed institution is declared insolvent
and a receiver is appointed. All insured deposits are paid off. Uninsured depositors do not receive the full amount of their deposits
and become general creditors of the receivership estate. The FDIC
also becomes a general creditor for the amount advanced to payoff
insured depositors. 154 A deposit pay:.off limits the· FDIC's losses
ble to what would have occurred if the bank had actually closed." [d. at 38,670. This policy
implements the FDIC's statutory duty to maintain stability in the banking system and to
preserve the Insurance Fund. See 12 U.S.c. § 1823(c)(1)(C); id. § 1823(c)(2)(B)(iii); id.
§ 1823(c)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
The FDIC revised its policy statement in late 1986 to reftect what then-Chairman William Seidman referred to as the "increasing supply of failed and failing banks ... [which
are] failures of units in multibank holding companies and one-bank holding companies,
large and small." See L. William Seidman, Perspectives on Open Bank Assistance, Address
Before the Government Relations Committee, Association of Bank Holding Companies
(Sept. 17, 1986), in THE THRIFT INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURED: THE NEW REGULATORS AND
QpPORTUNmES FOR THE FUTURE 181, 184 (PLI Com. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series
No. 508, 1989). That revision stated that "except where there are compelling reasons to the
contrary . . . [t]he financial effect on common shareholders and holders of material
amounts of subordinated debt and/or preferred stock of the failing bank must approximate
the effect which would have occurred had the assisted bank failed." 51 Fed. Reg. 44,122,
44,122-23 (1986). It also made clear that in order to preserve the insurance fund and where
an assisted bank is a subsidiary, an assistance proposal should be structured such that
the impact on directors, management, shareholders and creditors of the holding
company approximates what would be expected had the assisted subsidiary
bank failed ... and ... available resources from the holding company and its
other banks and/or nonbank subsidiaries are used to make significant contribution toward minimizing the financial exposure of the FDIC.
[d. at 44,123.
153 Neither of these alternative approaches would fully compensate the affiliate lender.
Besides, the FDIC usually rejects both of these because neither of them presents a least
cost alternative, which the agency is statutorily mandated to follow. See 12 U.S.c.
§ 1823(c)(4) (Supp. V 1993); see also DEPOSIT INSURANCE FOR THE NINETIES, supra note
46, at 228.
In a revised policy statement issued in 1988, the FDIC specifically addressed and
called for "common shareholders and holders of material amounts of subordinated debt
and/or preferred stock of the failing bank [to] approximate the financial effect which would
have occurred had the assisted bank failed." 51 Fed. Reg. 44,122, 44,123 (1986).
Then-FDIC Chairman William Seidman identified the crux of the problem. When
federal financial assistance is provided in what he termed "holding company situations ...
there is an obligation on the part of the whole of the organization to the health of each
affiliate. The failure of one bank within a holding company could well lead to the failure of
other banks in the organization. The problem should not be viewed on a stand-alone basis." Seidman, supra note 152, at 184.
.
154 See MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 14, at 1-32.
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because its exposure is to insured depositors only. Deposit payoffs tend to promote depositor discipline because large, uninsured
depositors are not fully compensated when the bank fails. 155 They
are more disruptive to the local economy because the FDIC
freezes the uninsured funds while it recovers the receivership
amounts. 156
4.

Insured Deposit Transfer

An insured deposit pay-off is a modification of the deposit
pay-off alternative. The failed institution is declared insolvent and
the FDIC is appointed as receiver. The potential acquiring institution submits a bid to the FDIC for the purchase of insured deposits
and certain assets. The insolvent and healthy institutions then
merge. To ease the disruptiveness of a straight deposit pay-off, the
FDIC makes a conservative estimate of the receivership recoveries
and issues a cash advance to the acquirors. The acquiror, acting as
an agent of the FDIC, makes immediate payments to the uninsured
depositors. The acquiring institution does not automatically assume the deposit accounts. Instead, the depositors have a specified
time within which to notify the acquiror that they wish to retain
their accounts with the acquirors.
5. Bridge Bank
Beginning in 1987, the FDIC began using a transitional transaction, a "bridge bank,"157 to stabilize the operations of an insolvent institution. A bridge bank is a temporary institution that
assumes the assets and some of the liabilities of the failed institution through a purchase and assumption agreement. The FDIC
then arranges for a permanent acquisition by a healthy institution.
The bridge bank has several significant advantages. First, for
the public, it is less disruptive to the community because the bridge
bank, after assuming the failed bank's obligations, is able to reopen
immediately. For the insurance fund, it is a way to control the costs
of the institution's failure. This is because uninsured depositors,
non deposit creditors, holding company creditors, and shareholders
155 This alternative for deposit accounts is chosen when potential acquirors are unwilling
to pay a premium sufficient to pass the FDIC's cost test and therefore the agency does not
use a purchase and assumption transaction. [d.
156 [d.
157 12 U.S.C § 1821(n) (Supp. V 1993).
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are not compensated· from the insurance fund, but instead lose
their investment. I58 •
B.

The Texas Paradigms: FirstRepublic and TAB

When a multibank holding system threatens failure, the FDIC
is concerned about the erosion of public confidence. Although the
regulators evaluate the alternatives for failure resolution of any financial institution based upon the potential adverse impact on the
economy, they choose a resolution. that is perceived as less disruptive although those alternatives may fully compensate affiliated
subsidiaries and creditors. 159
.
The rescue methods used by the FDIC to resolve the failures
of the subsidiary banks of Texas American Bancshares and First
RepublicBank Corporation, multibank systems located in Texas,
are illustrative of the legal issu~s that the FDIC faces in structuring
a transaction that separates the obligations owed to affiliated parties who may have contributed to the institution's insolvency.
Texas is the chosen example because the state's banks operate
under a system of unit banking. Due to state imposed restrictions
on branch banking in Texas, the banking industry is organized as
holding company structures with separately incorporated banking
subsidiaries. Although these situations will occur only in states
that have similar restrictions on branch banking, they are germane
because they highlight the flaws in the regulatory scheme that sanction misconduct by the controlling parent company. As discussed
below, uninsured creditors sued the FDIC, challenging the financial assistance package that did not fully compensate them. In
these situations, the permissive regulatory system allowed the managers of the institutions to amass massive losses without sufficient
safeguards to protect the federal deposit insurance fund.
1. ·First Republic

The First RepublicBank Corporation ("FRBC") and First
United Bancorporation, Inc. were bank holding companies that
owned a system of 41 banks located primarily throughout the state
of Texas. They also owned various nonbank subsidiaries. FRBC
controlled and operated its network of subsidiary banks as if it
were a single bank with branches. l60 The subsidiary bank in Dallas
158
159
160

See MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM. supra note 14. at 1-33.
See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.

FRBC and its wholly-owned subsidiary. IFRB. acknowledged that they ran the affiliated corporations and the bank subsidiaries as one banking system. In aggregate. the
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was the lead bank in the FRBC system. This meant that the other
subsidiary banks raised deposits, and advanced them to the Dallas
bank, which had huge lending activity.161
In late January 1988, FRBC publicly announced that $3.9 billion, or one percent, of the loans in the FRBC system were
nonperforming and that it had suffered a fourth quarter loss of
$347 million, bringing its 1987 losses to a total of $656 million. The
situation continued to deteriorate until depositor concerns about
the condition of FRBC led to a massive withdrawal of deposits. 162
FRBC requested financial assistance from the FDIC in March
1988. 163 Massive federal borrowing proved insufficient to solve the
problem, and publicity about the FRBC System's distressed financial condition only exacerbated withdrawals. By July 1988, the
FRBC system was again in dire financial straits and on the verge of
collapse. The OCC declared FRBC subsidiary banks insolvent, and
appointed the FDIC receiver of the failed subsidiary banks.164 The
FDIC provided $1 billion in financial assistance to Dallas and
Houston banks. The FDIC requested that the holding company
and the subsidiary banks enter into a contract to guarantee that the
loans would be repaid. 165 FRBC and IFRB filed voluntary petitions under Chapter 11.166 The FDIC then filed proofs of claim
against the parent companies based on the $1 billion guarantee.
The creditors of FRBC filed a lawsuit against the FDIC challenging the assistance package. 167 Specifically, the creditors alleged
FRBC system had over $28 billion in assets and accounted for 20% of the commercial
lending in Texas through some 125,000 borrowers with over $90 billion in unfunded loan
commitments. The FRCB system also had 25,000 trust department customers for which it
administered $50 billion in assets, 2.2 million deposit accounts, and over 1,000 correspondent bank relationships throughout the country. Brief for FDIC at 3-4, Senior Unsecured
Creditors' Comm. of First RepublicBank Corp. v. FDIC, 749 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Tex. 1990)
(No. CA-3-88-2871-D).
161 By March 1989, the unsecured debt which the Dallas Bank owed its sister banks had
increased to over $6 billion. Id. at 4.
162 The Dallas bank alone lost $599 million of deposits in a five-day period and the
FRBC System lost more than $1.8 billion in deposits during the first weeks of 1988. By
March 1988, the FRBC System was on the verge of financial collapse. Id.
163 At the time of that request, FRBC had tapped its emergency $2 billion line of credit
from a group of banks, thus exhausting its private sector sources of liquidity. To repay
these loans and cover the continuing depositor runs, the Dallas bank borrowed $2.6 billion
at the "discount window" of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Id. at 5.
164 A purchase and assumption transaction was later arranged with NCNB Corporation.
See Senior Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of First RepublicBank Corp. v. FDIC, 749 F.2d
758, 762 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
165 Brief for FDIC at 5-7.
166 Id. at 10.
167 Id. at 11.
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that the FDIC did not have the authority to condition the $1 billion
assistance package to the Dallas and Houston banks on a guarantee from the holding company and the subsidiary banks. They also
argued that the FDIC did not have the authority to subordinate the
intrasystem loans to the claims of depositors and general creditors
of the FRBC. Although the FDIC argued that § 13(c) gave it
broad discretion and maximum flexibility to determine the terms of
a financial assistance package, in February 1991, the agency settled
that lawsuit with the creditors. l68
2.

TAB

Texas American Bancshares, Inc. ("TAB Holding") owned a
system of twenty-four banks located throughout the state of Texas
and several nonbank subsidiaries. The lead subsidiary bank was
TABlFort Worth, which had forty-six percent of the total assets of
the TAB subsidiary banks as of December 31, 1988. TABlFort
Worth maintained obligations in the form of federal funds, certificates of deposits, and other deposit obligations to other TAB subsidiary banks.169
In October 1988, after the failure of an initial restructuring
plan in which TAB Holding and its subsidiaries participated, the
FDIC began soliciting bids for a purchase and assumption agreement. In July 1988, the FDIC arranged for a purchase and assumption transaction that resulted in the full payment of claims of all
nonsubordinated general creditors of TABlFort Worth, except
those obligations made to creditors who were TAB Holding
subsidiaries. 170
The TAB subsidiaries successfully challenged the FDIC assistance package. l7l The district court rejected the FDIC's argument
that the decision to treat the TAB affiliated creditors differently
168 The FDIC settled the litigation with the creditors by paying $121.8 million. See Steve
Klinkerman, FDIC Pays to Settle Texas Suit, AM. BANKER, Feb. 14, 1990, at to.
169 From its subsidiary banks, TABlFort Worth had purchased over $675 million in the
form of Fed funds, $120 million in the form of certificates of deposits, and over $54 million
in the from of demand deposits from subsidiary and nonaffiliated banks. See Texas Am.
Bancshares, Inc. v. Clarke, 740 F. Supp. 1243,1245-47 (N.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd, 954 F.2d 329
(5th Cir. 1992).
170 Id. at 1245. In the liquidation of TABlFort Worth, the FDIC decided that the TAB
subsidiaries receive no more than 67% of the face amount of the TABlFort Worth liabilities owed to each TAB subsidiary bank. The TAB subsidiary banks were later declared
insolvent, but the aee admitted afterward that had the obligations of TABlFort Worth to
the TAB subsidiaries been paid in full, the ace would not have declared any of the TAB
subsidiaries insolvent. Id. at 1246-47.
171 Id. at 1254.
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from other nonaffiliated creditors was designed to "further its statutory mission to preserve competence in the banking system while
protecting the Insurance Fund"; and that providing" 'enhanced
payments' to the TAB banks would 'reward' TAB Holding," under
whose poor management the TAB banking group failed. 172 The
district court hel~ that notJ:1ing under the National Bank Act gave
the FDIC the 'power to "manipulat[e] the recovery of affiliated
banks on the obligations owed to them in order to make those
banks insolvent as well."173 In fact, the court inferred that the
FDIC should have filed civil or cririlinallawsuits against the management of the TAB system if it believed that there was wrongdoing, instead of penalizing the related entities who were creditors of
the failed banks and ultimately the parent holding company which
lost its entire investment. 174
The challenge by unsecured creditors and affiliated subsidiaries,to the FDIC's choice of resolution alternatives in a multibank
holding company system indicates that the agency inay be unsuccessful in its efforts to exercise a solution that will defray its costs.
Although a resolution alternative may appear to be more equitable
to nonaffiliated parties, the courts may not uphold the agency's use
of discretion under secti9n 13(c) in structuring a resolution alternative. The courts unwillingness to treat the claims of affiliated entities differently underscores the need to provide a substantial
record of findings to assist the court in determining that in fact
affiliated parties who do not receive full payment for their claims
from the receivership estate are being treated fairly.175
VI.

AMALGAMATING PARENTAL GUARANTEES

A solution for resolving problem banks in a multi bank holding
company system is an amalgam of the existing parental guaran172 [d. at 1247. The FDIC based its argument on Woodbridge Plaza v. Bank of Irvine,
815 F.2d 538, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1987) and First Empire Bank v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361, 137071 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 919 (1978). It argued that the pro rata distribution rules
of the Federal Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 91, 194 (1988), required that unsecured creditors
only be paid an amount equivalent to what they would have received had the insolvent
bank been liquidated. Although the district court did not accept the FDIC's argument,
Texas Am. Bancshares, 740 F. Supp. at 1245-47, the FDIC was successful on the appellate
level. Texas Am. Bancshares v. Clarke, 954 F.2d 329, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1992).
173 Texas Am. Bancshares, 740 F. Supp. at 1253.
174 [d. at 1254. FIRREA requires the FDIC to pay any creditor of a failed bank an
amount equal to that which the claimant would have received if the FDIC had liquidated
the institution. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(E)(iii) (Supp. V 1993). Arguably, this provision
should have applied in the Texas American Bancshares litigation at the district court level.
175 See discussion infra part VI.C.
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tees. 176 Regulators should continue to require an acquisition evaluation at the time of acquisition of the financial and managerial
resources of a holding company to ensure that the parent company
seeking to acquire the bank subsidiary maintain its capital adequacy.177 The prompt corrective action provision, which requires
that the banking subsidiary submit a capital restoration plan when
an institution becomes capital deficient, is an appropriate alternative to a limited net worth maintenance agreement or a source of
strength condition. 178 In addition to the capital infusion required
under a capital restoration plan, regulators should have the discretion to require that holding company banks consolidate, if banking
subsidiaries have functioned as an economic unit prior to their
weakened capital status. 179
A.

Prefailure Enterprise Consolidation

Giving regulators the discretion to require the consolidation 180
of banking subsidiaries within a holding company structure upon
the trigger of the prompt corrective action plan is an effective
means of obtaining financial assistance for troubled bank subsidiaries. It encourages early reorganization of the enterprise in an effort to stem, perhaps, a temporary financial crisis. The limited
purpose of consolidation is to secure intercorporate financing for
bank subsidiaries that are becoming insolvent. It is a more effective mechanism for controlling corporate conduct prior to insolvency than the prompt corrective action provision alone because
enterprise consolidation acts as an internal device to control corporate conduct. Given a rule of unlimited liability, several aspects of
176 As will be discussed below, the present solutions do not balance the interests of the
insurance fund to avoid losses by having to pay the claims of affiliated shareholders and
creditors of the troubled institution in need of FDIC assistance. See discussion infra at part
VI.
.
177 As discussed supra part III, this is to ensure that the parent company will not leverage the subsidiary's assets in order to acquire the banking subsidiary.
178 Although this provision is flawed, its enactment by Congress vitiates the argument
that the source of strength condition is beyond the statutory authority of the regulatory
agencies. It also demonstrates that the net worth maintenance agreement as an implied
obligation is vague and indeterminate. See discussion supra part III.
179 In September 1994, Congress passed legislation authorizing interstate banking. See
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108
Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.c. (1994». There is a concern
that this legislation will lead to more voluntary bank consolidations as the American banking industry tries to remain competitive. See Wilmarth, supra note 63, at 978-82; Clyde
Mitchell, Legislation Affecting Interstate Banking, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 21, 1994, at 3.
180 The term "consolidation" refers to substantive consolidation of the assets of banking
subsidiaries rather than procedural consolidation of the bankruptcy proceedings of bankrupt affiliates.
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a shareholder's conduct vis-a-vis the assessment of the corporation's financial matters would change. First, a shareholder must actively assess financial information about the corporation to protect
him- or herself against the risks of the business enterprise. This
means that the shareholder, in addition to monitoring, must take
active measures to control speculative transactions. It also means
that there must exist some efficient means of assessing, and recovering from, individual shareholders their proportional share of the
corporation's debt. 181
Prefailure consolidation recognizes the wholeness of the separate economic units of the holding company in a manner similar to
enterprise liability.182 Like enterprise liability, it negates the notion that corporate separateness is necessarily and sufficiently evidenced by separate corporate charters. Rather, as with the concept
of enterprise liability, a close evaluation of the relationship between the parent and the subsidiary is necessary to determine if the
parent is an active or passive investor. 183
181 See Stone, supra note 39, at 73-74. Creditors of a corporation routinely contract
around potential parent company control by requiring that the parent and affiliated corporations guarantee a subsidiary's debt. This type of intersubsidiary liability substitutes for
the creditor's task of monitoring the subsidiary's operations. It guarantees that the creditor will be advantaged by the parent company's corporate conduct. It also shifts the risks
away from creditor to the entire business enterprise. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 34, at 103-09; see also Peter A. Alces, The Efficacy of Guaranty Contracts in Sophisticated Commercial Transactions, 61 N.C. L. REv. 655 (1983); Scott F. Norberg, Avoidability

of Intercorporate Guarantees Under Section 548(a)(2) and 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,
64 N.C. L. REv. 1099 (1986) (discussing the use of intercorporate guarantees as a means of
eliminating risks of a lender); Robert J. Rosenberg, Intercorporate Guaranties and the Law
of Fraudulent Conveyances: Lender Beware,125 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 236 n.2, 263-64 (1976)
(arguing that enterprise liability or joint and several liability among entities in the corporate group is an alternative to intercorporate guarantees).
182 See discussion in text supra note 29. The enterprise liability theory begins with the
notion that the parent corporation that owns 100% of the stock of its subsidiary is not a
passive investor.
Inherent in the subsidiary structure is the notion that the subsidiary operates for the
benefit of the parent. This means that subsidiaries may not operate in a profit-maximizing
manner. The parent may choose to strip the subsidiary of its productive assets, transfer
those assets into other parts of the enterprise, and leave the subsidiary's creditors to absorb
the losses. Whether the parent company has chosen to engage in asset stripping or is transferring assets for economic efficiency is not easily detectable. Because this type of decision
making cannot be controlled, the parent's conduct cannot be easily monitored. This also
means that monitoring the subsidiary is riskier. See Stone, supra note 39, at 11.
Creditors, presu~ably, are superior to shareholders as risk monitors in at least three
ways: assessing or protecting against the risk of insolvency, accepting the risk, and reducing
the cost of bankruptcy. See Ribstein, supra note 29, at 101-06.
183 See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRAcr,
AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 2.01 (1987); Landers, supra note 25, at 592-93.
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Prefailure consolidation parallels the theory of substantive
consolidation which is common in bankruptcy law. l84 The basic
premise of substantive consolidation is that the power of the bankruptcy court extends to all of the affiliates of the corporate enterprise. Enterprises that formerly were separate corporate bodies
may be subjected to the bankruptcy court's power to prevent unjust or fraudulent attempts to shield assets that otherwise would be
vulnerable to creditor's claims. Substantive consolidation allows
the property of solvent affiliates of a bankrupt debtor to be
reached to pay the bankrupt's liabilities. It combines the assets
and liabilities of the affiliated parties in order to invalidate inter entity claims and effect a more equitable distribution of property
among creditors. 185 The theory does not disregard corporate separateness. Instead, its application depends on whether the affiliates
prior to the debtor's bankruptcy behaved as a single economic unit,
although formally they were independent entities. l86 Bankruptcy
courts cautiously use the substantive consolidation power, which is
an equitable principle and not specifically authorized under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ("Bankruptcy Code").187
The clear advantage of substantive consolidation of banking
subsidiaries within a multi bank holding company system is that it is
a preinsolvency concentration of financial resources that can forestall immediate resort to the insurance fund, if not foreclose the
need for such resort altogether. The effect is that the enterprise
provides its own financial assistance or a cash advance to the troubled, failing institution. The use of regulatory powers to impose
substantive consolidation allows· the regulators the flexibility to
deal with the threatened failure, while also preserving some value
for not only the troubled subsidiary, but also for the entire
enterprise.
184

Banks and savings and loan associations are not subject to the Bankruptcy Code.

See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2)(d) ("Who may be a debtor").
185 See In re Baker & Getty Fin. Servs.• 78 B.R. 139, 141 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re
Manzy Land & Cattle Co., 17 B.R. 332,337 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1987).
186 Substantive consolidation of a corporate group allows the bankruptcy court to consolidate the assets and liabilities of different group members. From this single pool of
assets, all creditors of the group are paid and the entire enterprise can be recreated. See
generally Frost, supra note 43; Prager & Backman, supra note 43, at 701-09.
187 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). "Consolidation, as distinguished from joint administration, is neither authorized nor prohibited by this rule since
the propriety of consolidation depends on substantive considerations and affects the substantive rights of the creditors of the different estates." FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015 advisory
committee's note; see also 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11015.01, at 1015-2 to -3 (15th ed.
1988).
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This power188 to assert control over healthy bank subsidiaries
in the holding company system is appropriate because the solvency
of some of the healthy holding company subsidiaries may be dependent on the holding company operating other subsidiaries in an
unsafe and unsound manner.189 This assertion of control over the
solvent subsidiaries may serve to protect the soundness of the enterprise as a whole. The core aim of the action is to preserve the
value of the enterprise from further dissipation of its assets. 1OO To
empower regulators to consolidate the troubled and healthy banking subsidiaries would give regulators a greater level of supervisory
power over multibank holding company systems.
B.

The Current Law on Substantive Consolidation

The tendency of the parent company to pool the assets of related subsidiaries in order to maximize the parent company's profitability justifies the bankruptcy policy of substantive
188 A specific regulatory structure governs the liquidation of insolvent depository institutions. Similar to the bankruptcy code provision, the regulatory scheme has a predetermined priority of claims. The claims of depositors have priority over those of owners;
some claims are paid in full, while others are denied. See 12 U.S.C. § 194 (1988) (distribution of assets of failed national banks); 12 C.F.R. § 389.11 (1994) (distribution priority rules
for savings associations).
.
The same regulatory scheme governs the supervision and closure of troubled or failed
financial institutions. Under the grounds for the appointment of a receiver, the OCC or
OTS may close an institution if there has been a "substantial dissipation of assets or earnings." 12 U.S.c. § 1821(c)(S) (Supp. V 1993). This may mean that the institution is operating in a capital-deficient status with less than the required minimum level of capital. Under
the grounds for the appointment of a conservator, the OCC and OTS have specific authority to appoint a conservator to manage an institution on the basis of insufficient capital. [d.
§ 203(b)(1) (national banks); id. § 1464(d)(2)(B) (thrifts).
Under a consolidation theory, the owners of the institution would temporarily lose
control to the regulators. The subsidiary's charter would be suspended for such time as it
takes to facilitate the reorganization of the enterprise. At the end of that period, the subsidiary may apply to the chartering authority to have the charter reinstated. See 12 U.S.c.
§§ 21-27 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
189 FIRREA's statutory provision authorizing "cross-guarantee" power gives the FDIC
similar power over solvent banks and thrifts whenever it incurs a loss from insolvent banks
and thrifts within the same holding company system. See 12 U.S.c. § 181S(e) (Supp. V
1993). The restrictions may apply when the regulatory agency can show that, based on
noncapital supervisory criteria, safety and soundness supervisory concerns exist. [d.
190 Consolidation raises the problem that the government takeover of the institution
might diminish its value and result in losses to the shareholders. But see U.S. v. Gaubert,
111 S. O. 12~7 (1991) (rejecting a shareholder'S claim that federal operation of an insolvent savings and loan was negligent because Federal Torts Claims Act's discretionary function exception immuniied the operational or'management actions of federal regulators).
Note that .just as with a sale or liquidation, the consolidation of an institution may yield
some residual value that the owner is entitled to recover. See Christopher T. Curtis, The
Takings Clause and Regulatory Takeovers of Banks and Thrifts, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 367,
381 (1990).
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consolidation. 191 The case law on substantive consolidation is not
clear, however, on which factors make the policy applicable to a
given circumstance nor on the underlying principles that support
the use of the theory.
Courts examining the use of substantive consolidation in
bankruptcy proceedings frequently have applied analogous corporate law doctrines. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has
been the basis for several court decisions. 192 Commentators have
criticized this approach because it fails to assess the reality of the
corporate group's functioning. 193 An approach more analogous to
substantive consolidation that recognizes the existence of the economic relationship of the related entities is equitable
subordination. 194
see Landers, supra note 25, at 632.
In Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1940), the court adopted a "piercing the
corporate veil" analysis to determine whether a parent and its subsidiary should be treated
as a single entity. The court identified the relevant factors as:
(1) The parent corporation owns all or a majority of the capital stock of the
subsidiary;
(2) The parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors or
,
officers;
(3) The parent corporation finances the subsidiary;
(4) The parent company subscribes to all of the capital stock of the subsidiary
or otherwise causes its incorporation;
(5) The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital;
(6) The parent company pays the salaries or expenses or losses of the
subsidiary;
(7) The subsidiary has substantially no business except with the parent corporation or no assets except those conveyed to it by tlte parent corporation;
(8) ... "[T]he subsidiary" is referred to as [a subsidiary] or as a department or
a division [of the parent corporation];
(9) The directors and executives of the subsidiary do not act independently in
the interest but take direction from the parent corporation; and
(10) The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary as a separate and independent corporation are not observed.
Id. at 191.
.
193 See Landers, supra note 25, at 633-34. Professor Landers notes also that the approach is of limited value since most courts avoid piercing the corporate veil due to the
doctrine of limited liability. See also J. Stephen Gilbert, Substantive Consolidation in
Bankruptcy: A Primer,43 VAND. L. REv. 207,218 (1990) (criticizing the analogy to piercing the corporate veil in substantive consolidation cases because substantive consolidation
does not involve the doctrine of limited liability which. holds shareholders responsible for
.
the debts of the corporation)..
194 Equitable subordination focuses on the creditors who are competing for receipt of
the pooled assets. Substantive consolidation, like equitable subordination, is a preferable
approach when related entities have comingled assets because it requires that the claims of
affiliated entities be given a lesser priority status for full repayment. See generally Helen
D. Chaitman, The Equitable Subordination of Bank Claims, 39 Bus. LAW 1561 (1984).
191

192
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Courts use substantive consolidation cautiously because they
are concerned with whether it is equitable to creditors. Specifically, the concern is whether creditors who do business with a single corporation are aware that their repayment will come from the
enterprise as a whole, which necessarily means that less assets are
available for distribution. The cases in which the courts have allowed substantive consolidation fall generally into one of four categories. 195 The courts have allowed substantive consolidation when
there was evidence of the comingling of assets;196 when firms had
inadequate capital;197 when related corporations used unified advertising;198 and when related corporations used each other's funds
or property as cross-guarantees, or for payment of financial
obligations. 199
1\vo cases, Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. Kheel2°O and
In re Flora Mir Candy Corp. ,201 are noteworthy for identifying
when substantive consolidation should occur. Although the
Kheep02 court allowed substantive consolidation and the court in
See Landers, supra note 25.
See Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635 (1942). The
officers of a Virginia corporation and a Delaware corporation were the same. The Virginia
corporation did not have any independent corporate activity-no money was paid into its
treasury and no contracts were executed on its behalf-and its corporate records, which
contained transcriptions from the books of the Delaware corporation, were kept in Dela~
ware. Id. at 286.
In Soverio v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 328 F.2d 446, 447 (2d Cir. 1964), the court approved
the use of substantive consolidation where the bankrupt corporation and its affiliates were
in the same line of business, and the bankrupt corporation provided all of the financing to
the affiliate and signed a majority of the affiliates' leases. All of the affiliates of the corporate enterprise had the same two shareholders and directors. The affiliates did not have
working capital, corporate minutes, or separate bank account balances large enough to pay
local obligations such as rent and utilities. They were listed as assets of the bankrupt corporation and, on stationary and advertising, referred to as branches.
197 In these cases, the courts could show that one corporation relied completely on a
related corporation for the payment of operational expenses. See In re Assoc. Gas & Elec.
Co., 149 F.2d 996, 1002, 1005 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 736 (1945); Stone, 127 F.2d at
284.
198 See Soverio, 328 F.2d at 446; Trustees Sys. Co. v. Payne, 65" F.2d 103, 105 (3d Cir.
1933).
199 See Consolidated Rock Prods. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Fish, 114 F.2d at 117;
Barr & Creelman Mill & Plumbing Supply Co. v. Zoller, 109 F.2d 924, 927 (2d Cir. 1940);
In re Eilers Music House, 270 F. 915 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 646 (1921).
200 369 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1966).
201 432 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1970).
202 The court found profit maximization in Kheel because eight shipping companies that
one individual owned or controlled disregarded their corporate separateness. The corporations shifted funds, made intercorporate loans, regularly paid each other's obligations, and
made withdrawals and payments from and to corporate accounts without sufficient recordkeeping. Kheel, 369 F.2d at 846. The court also found consolidation reasonable because of
the effort and expense of reconstructing the financial records of the debtor corporations.
195
196
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.Flora Mi,z°3 did not, both cases identified disregard of corporate

separateness and the equitable interest of creditors who relied
upon payment from a single creditor rather than from the whole
enterprise as the most significant factors supporting a court's decision making. 204 In these two cases, the court's evaluation turns to
whether the related corporations functioned as a single economic
unit. 205 Specifically, the court is trying to determine whether the
affiliates have an incentive to maximize profits for the entire corporate enterprise without regard to the affiliates's own
profitability.2OO
Bankruptcy courts tend to allow substantive consolidation
only if there is a disregard for separateness or the affairs of the
affiliates are hopelessly entangled.207 This stringent standard could
be lessened somewhat in the banking context without violating the
Creditors were not able to make a feasible detennination, allowance, or classification of
claims as needed to assert claims under the plan of liquidation. Id. at 847.
203 In Flora Mir. the court emphasized the reliance interest of the creditors opposing
substantive consolidation. This case involved one parent company and twelve subsidiaries
and affiliates that had filed individual plans of reorganization. Flora Mir, the parent company acquired Meadors six years after Meadors had issued debentures. When the debenture holders brought an action in state court against two Flora Mir companies and Meadors
for fraud, the related corporations moved for consolidation. The court refused to consolidate Meadors with the other debtors, finding that these creditors had not relied on the
credit of any consolidated group. The creditors would also be unfairly prejudiced because
consolidation would eliminate a misappropriation of assets claim that Meador might have
against Flora Mir. Flora Mir, 432 F.2d at 1062-63.
204 See Kheel. 369 F.2d at 1062-63; Flora Mir, 432 F.2d at 847.
205 The Kheel court allowed consolidation because the administration of the estate
would be unduly burdened with the cost of disentangling the financial records of affiliated
corporations and because consolidation facilitated the plan of reorganization. Kheel, 369
F.2d at 847. The standard, however, is strict because the court requires a showing that the
disentanglement of records threatens the realization of any net assets. Parties urging consolidation have attempted Kheel's entanglement argument but have not met its strict standard. See Flora Mir, 432 F.2d at 1060; In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F. 2d SIS, 518
(2d Cir. 1988); In re Gulfco, 593F.2d 921, 925 (10th Cir. 1979).
Judge Friendly, in a concurring opinion, recognized that the impossibility of an accurate assessment of the financial condition of the debtor corporations might warrant consolidation. He expressed a preference, however, for allowing consolidation only after a
reasonable effort has been made to identify the creditor's reliance interest and protect it.
Kheel, 369 F.2d at 848.
206 Professor Landers argues that the profit maximization test is more accurate in determining the relationship between affiliate corporations than the traditional tests that the
courts use, such as whether corporate fonnalities were observed, because what is most
significant is whether the corporations operate as a single unit. He contends that most
creditors are aware of the existence of a common operation within the holding company
structure, thereby making the reliance argument inapplicable. See Landers, supra note 25,
at 600-05.
207 See William H. Thornton, The Continuing Presumption Against Substantive Consolidation, 105 BANKING L.J. 448,451 (1988) (pointing out that the theory of limited liability
underlies courts' reluctance to use substantive consolidation).
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equitable considerations that underly the use of substantive consolidation. If bank holding companies are manipulating the multibank
system by concentrating risky loans in one or two banks, substantive consolidation acts as a control on the parent company conduct.
This makes disregard of corporate separateness the most important
factor for determining whether substantive consolidation should be
applied. Thus, the appropriate focus becomes the relationship of
the banking subsidiary to its owners and not the creditors'
reliance. 208
The FDIC serves two distinct purposes, both of which are consistent with using substantive consolidation in this context.. First,
Congress has charged the FDIC, as well as the other federal regulators, with protecting the integrity of the nation's banking system.
Second, FDIC provides deposit insurance for member institutions
thus providing depositor confidence. Both of these public purposes should be balanced against the interests of the parent company, healthy banking subsidiaries, and creditors. Imposing
substantive consolidation discourages the parent company from
shifting the risks of failure to the FDIC in a way that balances the
harm to these other interests.
The doctrine of limited liability should not protect the parent
company who operated the subsidiary without regard to corporate
formalities. Neither should limited liability protect the healthy
subsidiary that participates in a plan that results in weakening another subsidiary.209 To impose liability, it should be shown that the
healthy subsidiary contributed to the condition that .caused the
weakened subsidiary in ways other than common ownership. This
relationship is sufficient to make the healthy subsidiary responsible
for the troubled subsidiary's liabilities. If this application of substantive consolidation were to become ~ part of the statutory
scheme, healthy banking subsidiaries would operate with the ex208 Although creditors of the healthy subsidiary are likely to oppose substantive consolidation more'vigorously than those of the troubled banking subsidiary, consolidation may
work to satisfy the equitable claims of both groups of creditors. If,. as Professor Landers
argues, creditors do not have a reliance interest because they are aware of the operating
relationships of the related corporations, it is only fair that those same creditors not benefit
due to a plan of consolidation. See Landers, supra note 25, at 630-32. Moreover, the FDIC
is a potential creditor when it steps in as receiver to marshal the assets of the failed banking subsidiary. The agency, therefore, is entitled also to some protection because its financial assistance to the failed institution may involve taxpayers' monies.
209 To control the practice of isolating bad or risky loans in one banking subsidiary, a
healthy banking subsidiary may be subject to government regulation. The FDIC must be
able to show a direct relationship between the assessed liability and the healthy subsidiary.
The assessed liability satisfies the proportional liability that the healthy subsidiary has already incurred through its participation with the weakened subsidiary.
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pectation that if they chose to engage in excessive affiliate lending
practices, which resulted in captive funding, then they may not remain in possession of their assets and they might be held accountable for a proportion of the debt that resulted from participation in
this profit-maximizing scheme. Conversely, healthy subsidiaries
would also be on notice that if they 'avoid these types 'of practices,
they will not be in danger of regulatory imposed consolidation 210
Finally, substantive consolidation remedies the potential for
injustice to the taxpayers. This injustice results when the FDIC
must use the limited resources of the insurance fund for the benefit
of banking subsidiaries while the parents are shielded by limited
liability simply because of their separate legal existence. Taxpayers
should not be held responsible for paying for the means that the
parent company has employed to use the corporate structure to its
advantage.
C. Defining the Economic Relationship
In the context of a multi bank holding company, substantive
consolidation is consistent with the regulatory scheme of liquidation of failed financial institutions because it requires a reorganization and redistribution of assets among corporate affiliates in a
manner that is fair and equitable.211 Although a bankruptcy court
will recognize limited liability when considering the allocation of
the debts of an enterprise, it does not recognize that principle in a
vacuum. While adopting a policy of consolidation to assist a troubled thrift or bank in reorganization would displace the theory of
limited liability, it may equitably serve the interests of depositors,
the insurance fund, and other creditors.212
Prefailure consolidation may involve a troubled banking subsidiary, as well as a healthy one. 213 Most significant is the relation210 As the court recognized in the Bank of New England litigation, when the healthy
banking subsidiary has not disregarded corporate fonn, it is unfair to infringe its protections under the corporate law doctrine of limited liability. See discussion infrfJ note 208.
211 Usually, substantive consolidation occurs when each of the affiliated entities is bankrupt, although it can be applied when one affiliate is insolvent and one is solvent. Some
commentators are critical ,of this approach and look instead to elements identified by the
bankruptcy courts. See Thornton, supra note 207, at 451.
212 Cf FDIC v. Sea Pines, 692 F. 2d 973 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928 (1983).
213 Consolidation may be necessary when institutions are nominally solvent. Under the
Bankruptcy Code, a trustee may reach a debtor's assets without regard to the debtor's
insolvency. If the trustee detennines that there has been either, a fraudulent transfer, 11
U.S.C. § 548 (1988), or a preferential transfer, id. § 547, the trustee may recover properties
that the debtor transferred to third parties, id. § 550. This recovery OCcurs even if the
parties were solvent at the time of the transfer and remain solvent throughout the bankruptcy proceeding.
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ship between the banking subsidiaries prior to a status of capital
deficiency. Consolidation should be triggered in a manner consistent with the prompt corrective action provision-when capital
levels fall below the regulatory minimum. 214 At the point of capital
deficiency, if regulators determine that the banking subsidiaries are
functioning as an economic unit, the regulators could require that
the troubled financial institution's capital restoration plan call for
the consolidation of economic resources. .
The legal issue to be addressed is what factors determine the
decision to consolidate. In determining the economic relationship
. of the corporate groups, the issues to be addressed are: (1)
whether the subsidiaries have separate economic identities; and (2)
whether consolidation benefits the public interest. 21s
1.

Do the Subsidiaries Have Separate Economic Identities?

An examination of economic separateness focuses on the relationship of the troubled subsidiary to the healthy subsidiary as well
as the relationship of the troubled subsidiary to all of the subsidiaries and to the parent company. To determine whether individual
subsidiaries within the multibank holding company have a separate
economic identity, there must be an evaluation of the relationship
between the healthy and troubled banking subsidiaries. This evaluation focuses on the parent company's exercise of its control over
the siblings. Since by statute, a parent company's "control" of a
subsidiary is determined by virtue of its percentage of stock ownership, this evaluation focuses on whether the parent company has
exercised that control vis-a-vis the conduct of its subsidiaries.
To reach the assets of a capital deficient banking subsidiary, or
one that complies with FDICIA's capital standards, the regulators
should bear the burden of proving that the economic circumstances
favor consolidation over other resolution alternatives. Before proceeding with consolidation, the FDIC should be required to make a
factual finding on the relationship of the two entities. 216 That fac214 As stated in the 'Ji"easury Department report, "[t]his presupposes that reported capital levels are a meaningful reflection of the economic condition of the bank." MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 14, at X-2.
215 In a recent decision, In re AugielRestivo Baking Co., 860 F. 2d 515, 518 (2d Cir.
1988), the court concluded that most factors considered are merely variants on two critical
factors: (1) whether creditors dealt with the entities as a single economic unit and did not
rely on their separate economic identities; and (2) whether the affairs of the debtors are so
entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors. See Landers, supra note 25, at 592-

93.
216 In order to avoid the abuse of administrative remedies, the FDIC should be required
to adopt regulations and provide administrative proceedings for an expedited hearing on
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tual finding is necessarily different depending upon whether the
subsidiary is healthy or troubled.
To support a finding that the parent company controls a
healthy subsidiary that is a part of the bank holding company structure, the agency would consider the following relevant factors:
(1) whether the parent company refers to all of the subsidiaries
as a unit of the parent;
(2) whether the parent company is responsible for the policymaking of all of the subsidiaries;
(3) whether the parent company owns a majority of the stock of
all of the subsidiaries;
(4) whether the parent company and subsidiary have common
officers and directors; and
(5) whether the parent company directs the daily operation of
funds management. 217

These factors focus on the parent company's conduct and its
relationship to the subsidiaries under its control. The factors tends
to show whether the subsidiary is a separate corporation distinct
from the other subsidiaries owened by the parent. Although no
one factor may be decisive, these provide a basis for the agency to
balance the circumstances in an equitable fashion.
The presence of these circumstances also tends to support the
conclusion that the parent company is not the typical shareholder-the passive investor allowing the financial markets to reflect changes in the enterprise's liability. They may also support
the conclusion that the parent company has played a role in the
subsidiary's management of its financial resources. The parent
company's actions may result in changes in the financial markets?18
Thus, the parent company of a federally insured banking subsidiary
that shifts the losses away from a healthy subsidiary to a troubled
one may be externalizing the losses of its troubled subsidiary to the
insurance fund. These factors should operate to make the parent
company accountable for its conduct in the control of its subsidiarthe record because property rights of the healthy subsidiary are involved. See Aman, supra
note 104, at 881-82; see also Note, Of Property Rights and the Fifth Amendment: F1RREA's
Cross-Guarantee Reexamined, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 293 (1991) (discussing the fairness
of FIRREA's cross-guarantee provisions under a substantive due process analysis).
217 The factors to be considered are similar to those used in the bankruptcy context, as
explained by the court in Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940). The existence of
the insurance fund makes the application of the factors different. See infra text accompanying note 220.
218 See discussion in text supra note 61.
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ies and thereby shift the risk of losses away from the insurance
fund to the bank holding company.219
In determining whether a banking subsidiary has become financially troubled for the benefit of the parent, the evaluation focuses on the control that the parent company has exercised over
the troubled subsidiary. The factors that the FDIC should consider
relevant are:
(1) whether the subsidiary is undercapitalized as defined in the
§ 38 of FDICIA;
(2) whether the capital deficient subsidiary has "captive funding,,;220 and
.
(3) whether a healthy subsidiary may withdraw its. accounts
upon a determination of either capital deficiency or
insolvency.

Requiring the FDIC to make these findings is necessary for
several reasons. First, consolidation involves the use of the healthy
subsidiary's assets, and therefore, the rights of shareholders and
creditors of the solvent subsidiary must be taken into account.221
Therefore, a determination of the relationship between the healthy
subsidiary and the troubled one as well as the control that the parent company exercises over both is critical. Second, it may be
shown that the healthy subsidiary is protecting itself against insolvency by engaging in transactions with the financially troubled subsidiary. As an affiliate lender to the troubled subsidiary, the
healthy subsidiary withdraws the deposits made to the troubled
subsidiary when that subsidiary threatens insolvency. However, allowing the healthy subsidiary to withdraw funds from the troubled
subsidiary in these circumstances may be unwarranted because the
healthy subsidiary is in a position to monitor the troubled subsidiary's operations and may have made imprudent transactions with
219 The FDIC's cross-guarantee powers, recently enacted by Congress, are postfailure
powers with a similar underlying premise. See 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e} (Supp. V 1993). Under
those powers, the FDIC may assess payment from the solvent affiliates toward the resolution of the entire enterprise. See Broome, supra note 7, at 960-63; see also Branch v. U.S.,
No. 93-133C, 1994 WL 380903 (Ct. CI. July 20, 1994), appeal granted, 42 FJd 1409 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (denying the use of FIRREA's cross-guarantee remedy without a specific finding that the subsidiary banks did not have separate economic and/or corporate identities).
220 See supra text accompanying note 58.
221 Creditors and shareholders of a healthy bank subsidiary may be able to raise due
process claims based on the value of their assets. A provision similar to the one found in
the Emergency Bank Consolidation Act of 1988, S. 2715, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)
(proposed but unpassed legislation), which requires that shareholders and creditors receive
within 30 days of consolidation an 'assessment of their debt or equity interest in the combined enterprise, is needed. Such a provision would also protect those healthy bank subsidiaries which have negative economic values, but po~itive regulatory capital.
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the troubled subsidiary.222 . The recommended factors allow the
FDIC to detect when a parent company has chosen to operate the
troubled subsidiary in a way that is not profitable. They also help
to support a finding that the actions of the parent are unfair and
unjust when the troubled subsidiary is becoming insolvent for the
benefit of another healthy subsidiary, and ultimately for the benefit
.
of the parent. 223
2.

Does Consolidation Benefit the Public Interest?224

Consolidation allows the FDIC to use the resources of the
holding company's healthy subsidiaries to resolve the problems of
the capital deficient ones. In assessing whether consolidation benefits the pubic interest, the evaluation focuses on the impact of
consolidation on local economic conditions as well as on the costs
of consolidation to the insurance fund.2 25
First, requiIjng consolidation protects the insurance fund in
several ways. Consolidation could restrict affiliate lending. A parent company that knows that captive funding can be used at the
cost of possible temporary consolidation may decide to limit its use
of captive funding. If the parent company does limit its captive
funding, this reduces or 'eliminates the healtIiy subsidi"ary as a creditor of the troubled subsidiary. Consolidation also .could prohibit
healthy subsidiary banks from withdrawing their funds from a financially troubled subsidiary. Since captive funding is one of the
factors that demonstrates an interrelationship between a healthy
and troubled subsidiary, the losses of the lead bank that would be
absorbed by the insurance fund when a healthy subsidiary withdraws its deposits would be eliminated. When consolidation occurs, the deposits of the banking subsidiaries are combined,
'therefore the healthy subsidiary is no longer able to withdraw
See supra text accompanying notes 49-62.
The court considering the claims of the FDIC to use its cross-guarantee assessment
powers against healthy subsidiaries in the holding company structure, recognized that
under the BHCA, each bank in the multibank holding system is a separate corporation.
Although there was no statutory predicate for a finding of wrongdoing, mismanagement,
or disregard of corporate separateness, that court found that there could be no assessment
until it made such an inquiry. See Branch v. U.S., No. 93-133C, 1994 WL 380903 (Ct. Cl.
July 20, 1994), appeal granted, 42 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
224 The FDIC must choose the least costly alternative in resolving the failure of a bank
or thrift. See 12 U.S.c. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
225 The financial costs of consolidation under this extension of the prompt corrective
actfon provision may not be capable of determination. Although some commentators view
early efforts like prompt corrective action as "costless," this may not be accurate since it is
difficult, if not impossible, to assess the changes in market value when the policy is used.
See MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 14, at X-21.
222

223
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funding from the troubled subsidiary. This ultimately reduces the
amount of FDIC assistance needed to resolve the capital deficiency
of the troubled subsidiary. By reducing the losses of the troubled
subsidiary, the FDIC reduces the amount of financial assistance
needed to resolve the financial losses. 226
Second, the problems of the troubled subsidiary become the
problems of the healthy one. This provides an incentive for the
parent company to attempt the rescue of the troubled bank.227 By
combining the assets of the troubled banking subsidiary with those
of the healthy banking subsidiary, consolidation makes joint funds
available for repayment of any FDIC financial assistance. This repayment from the assets of the combined subsidiaries protects the
insurance fund. 228
Finally, consolidation may address some of the concerns raised
regarding the effect of a banking crisis on the local economic condition. 229 A financial crisis in a bank holding company system may
signal distress to other financial markets and affect them adversely.
The erosion of public confidence justifies the actions to be taken
when a bank in a multi-bank holding company threatens failure. 23o
The alternatives for failure resolution balance the potentially adverse impact on the local and national economy against use of the
deposit insurance funds to abate the crisis.231 Since regulators have
often moved to abort failure either by arranging a merger, a recapitalization or a managed reduction in size,232 consolidation will provide the same remedy from among the entire corporate
enterprise's own resources. 233
226

227

See supra text accompanying note 47.

Although it has been argued that an "early closure" procedure such as consolidation
may negatively affect the bank's franchise value, those same institutions may suffer additional losses in franchise value when they continue to operate at an undercapitalized level,
losing valuable personnel, customers, and business opportunities. See MODERNIZING THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 14, at X-17.
228 See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
229 See supra text accomapnying note 63.
230 See supra text accomapnying note 64.
231 See supra text accomapnying note 66.
232 During 1988 and 1989, failed and assisted banks in Texas comprised over 80% of
total U.S. failed bank assets and over 80% of total FDIC reserves for losses of failed banks.
From 1980 to 1989, 349 Texas commercial banks failed and an additional 76 requested
FDIC assistance. See John O'Keefe, The Texas Banking Crisis: Causes and Consequences
1980-89,3 FDIC BANKING REV. 1,2 (Winter 1990).
233 The FDIC should have the discretion to determine which of several options will provide the best solution. In proposed legislation that Congress did not pass, those options
were identified as an order by the FRB (or, in some cases, OTS) to the parent company to:
1) transfer the stock of one or more of its healthy banks to the troubled bank;
2) merge one or more of its subsidiary banks into the troubled bank;
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CONCLUSION

The legal rule of limited liability allows bank holding companies to shift the costs of engaging in risky banking activities to the
federal deposit insurance fund. To reduce the social and economic
costs of limited liability and to control corporate conduct in a regulated industry, Congress created a new type of parental guarantee-prompt corrective action. It becomes operable when a bank
subsidiary has the greatest incentive to engage in risk taking activity-when it is undercapitalized. As an extension of prompt corrective action, Congress should consider prefailure enterprise
consolidation. This change would consider the totality of the circumstances leading to a banking subsidiary's troubled status and
may reduce the social and economic costs of risky corporate conduct while also providing better protection to the federal deposit
insurance fund.

3) merge the troubled bank into one or more if its healthy banks;
4) contribute or transfer or provide to a troubled bank, or require a subsidiary
to contribute, or transfer or provide to a troubled bank any such assets or
services as are customarily utilized by a bank in the conduct of its business
operations; or
5) any combination of the specified actions.
See Emergency Consolidation Act of 1988, S. 2715, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (proposed
but unpassed legislation).

